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ABSTRACT 
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were approved with 
the most earnest of good intentions at the First United Nations Crime Congress in 1955, 
in an attempt to establish “what is generally accepted as being good principle and practice 
in the treatment of prisoners and the management of institutions.”  In spite of their noble 
purpose, implementation of these rules has been somewhat of a disappointment.  Europe 
has adopted the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale.  The United States, by contrast, has 
declined to adopt a set of standards patterned after the Standard Minimum Rules, relying 
instead on pre-existing correctional standards bolstered by reforms resulting from 
prisoner civil rights litigation. This paper will review the status of the Standard Minimum 
Rules and, using Europe and the United States as examples, will demonstrate how these 
guidelines can be an important, and not an impotent, tool when implemented in 
connection with a domestic enforcement mechanism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scandals involving mistreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and 
at the Guantanamo Bay detention center have raised questions about what legal 
protections apply to the persons imprisoned in these facilities.  There has been much 
debate about the extent to which international law protects individuals seized during the 
“war on terror,” particularly about application of the laws protecting prisoners of war 
found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3 While this discussion has frequently focused on 
 
3 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (12 
Aug. 1949) (“Geneva Convention I”); Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces 
at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (12 Aug. 1949) 
(“Geneva Convention II”); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (“Geneva Convention III”) 75 U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. 3364, 6 U.S.T. 3316 
whether terror suspects qualify for protection under the laws of war as “lawful” or 
“unlawful” combatants,4 it has also highlighted protections intended to apply to all 
detainees, such as those found in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (the “Standard Minimum Rules”),5 which were approved with 
high hopes in 1955. 
 In spite of the longstanding existence of the Standard Minimum Rules, 
enforcement of prisoners rights on an international level has proven frustrating.  Apart 
from the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of prisoners of war and other 
multinational agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,6 or the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
 
(12 Aug. 1949); and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (12 Aug. 1949)  
(“Geneva Convention IV”). 
4 See generally George C. Harris, Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the 
Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31 (2003); 
Anne E. Joynt, Note, The Semantics of the Guantanamo Bay Inmates: Enemy 
Combatants or Prisoners of the War on Terror, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 427 
(2004); Pierre-Richard Prosper, United States Policy and Practice for the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1153
(2005); Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill and Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons 
or “Extra-Conventional Persons:” How Unlawful Combatants in the War on 
Terrorism Posted Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and 
Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 681 (2005). 
5 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted Aug. 30, 1955, 
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 
2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E.5988 (1977), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/g1smr.htm.
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
entered into force March 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States June 8, 
1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). 
Treatment or Punishment,7 there is no international treaty devoted solely to the rights of 
detainees.  Unlike these conventional sources,8 the model guidelines found in the 
Standard Minimum Rules are considered a “soft” source of international law.9 Soft 
sources of law assist in identifying trends or matters of concern within the international 
community, but they do not impose legally binding obligations on their own.10 Of 
course, these soft sources can be an important component of customary international law, 
which depends on objective patterns of state practice and subjective patterns of 
expectation in order to establish that a given norm may be considered universally binding 
 
7 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1988). 
8 There are many sources of international law, but some sources have a higher 
priority.  See Statute of the Court of International Justice, Art. 38(1), T.S. No. 
993, 59 Stat. 1055 (June 26, 1945) (identifying international conventions, 
international custom, “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” 
as well as ‘judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations” as among the sources).  A “hard” source such as 
a multilateral convention or treaty generally becomes binding on a party once the 
instrument is signed and ratified in accordance with domestic laws.  See MARK W. 
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-40 (4th ed. 2003).  In 
contrast to a legally binding treaty among nations, resolutions of international 
organizations — such as the United Nations — are sometimes regarded as “soft 
law.”  Id. at 52-53.  Thus, there is a distinction between sources of international 
law and so-called “soft” sources that, while not strictly binding, are not 
completely void of legal significance.  Id. United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1988). 
9 See RICHARD B. LILLICH AND HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 276-339 (3rd ed. 1995) (discussing the 
creation of new human rights norms created by the United Nations other than by 
treaty, using the Standard Minimum Rules as an example of the “model law” or 
“soft law” approach). 
10 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61 (2001) (describing sources 
of “soft” international law). 
without the need for a treaty or convention.11 A given source’s vitality, its status, and its 
utility are objective factors in this analysis.   
 The Standard Minimum Rules were intended to serve as important source of 
guidelines for good prison administration.  Unlike the Geneva Conventions, however, 
which have been widely accepted, the implementation process for the Standard Minimum 
Rules has been fairly flaccid, undercutting its potency as a source of protection for 
prisoners.12 This has not been for lack of well meaning efforts, however ineffective, 
undertaken by the United Nations and advocates of the Standard Minimum Rules.  
 Thirty years ago, proponents of the Standard Minimum Rules encouraged 
wholesale adoption by means of direct incorporation into domestic legal systems as 
opposed to indirect piece-meal implementation through judicial interpretation.13 Europe 
 
11 See JANIS, supra note 8 at 41-48. 
12 Domestic implementation of international legal norms such as those found in the 
Geneva Conventions or the Standard Minimum Rules generally occurs through 
the process of incorporation.  See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (2nd ed. 2003). Sometimes incorporation occurs 
directly, such as where a state incorporates an international law through a 
legislative act.  See id. Sometimes incorporation occurs indirectly, such as where 
an international norm is used as an interpretive aid to clarify or supplement 
domestic law.  See id. A third type of incorporation occurs by reference, such as 
when a domestic statute refers to a particular source of international law.  See id. 
at 13-14 (pointing to federal statutes outlawing “piracy as defined by the law of 
nations” or violations of the “law of war”).   
13 Douglas J. Besharov and Gerhard Mueller, The Demands of the Inmates of Attica 
State Prison and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners: A Comparison, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 839, 853 (1972) (advocating 
general acceptance through wholesale adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules 
into domestic law as “preferable to the route of unpredictable and expensive court 
litigation, point by point, standard by standard”). 
has followed this direct strategy,14 adopting the Standard Minimum Rules outright and 
updating them with their own set of regional guidelines known as the European Prison 
Rules.15 The United States, by contrast, has not formally adopted the Standard Minimum 
Rules, but has relied instead on standards developed by different professional 
organizations and on enforcement of prisoners rights through litigation that sometimes 
takes the Standard Minimum Rules into consideration.  Thus, it can be said that the 
United States has taken an indirect approach to incorporating the Standard Minimum 
Rules.16 
Regardless of the means of incorporation, the Standard Minimum Rules, by 
themselves, have not achieved the level of respect accorded to formal treaties.  This paper 
will review the status of the Standard Minimum Rules within Europe and the United 
States to examine their effectiveness — or lack thereof — in each system.  To provide 
some context for the development of the Standard Minimum Rules, part one of this paper 
will briefly review prison reform movements in Europe and the United States.  Part two 
 
14 See PAUST, supra note 12, at 12 (“Direct incorporation of international law 
involves use of an international agreement or customary international law directly 
as law forming the basis for a claim, right, duty, power, civil cause of action, 
criminal prosecution, or other type of sanction.”). 
15 See Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, Resolution No. 73(5) (Jan. 19, 1973); Council of Europe, European 
Prison Rules, Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States (Strasbourg, Feb. 12, 1987). 
16 See PAUST, supra note 12, at 12 (“In this instance, international law is not used 
directly as the basis for a civil claim or criminal prosecution, but indirectly to 
inform the meaning of some other law or legal instrument.”); see also, e.g., Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (examining the content of international norms 
to inform the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and whether the execution of juveniles qualified as “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under evolving standards of decency). 
of the paper will examine the history of the Standard Minimum Rules as an important 
human rights instrument and will comment separately on how the implementation 
process has sputtered at an international level.  This section of the paper will also offer 
some generalizations about which provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules have 
become settled international norms.  Part three of the paper will address how prisoners’ 
rights are protected in Europe and the United States by prison standards that have been 
influenced by the Standard Minimum Rules in different ways as well as by the 
availability of judicial review for abusive practices and conditions.  This part of the paper 
will also make a few observations about why the Standard Minimum Rules have 
influenced these systems differently and how this has affected their utility.  This review 
will show that, while the Standard Minimum Rules serve an important function of 
articulating generally accepted levels of prison administration, these guidelines, standing 
alone, are ineffectual without an enforcement mechanism to vindicate the rights of 
prisoners who have suffered true mistreatment. 
I. HISTORY OF PRISON REFORM  
A brief overview of historical prison reform movements will assist with a 
comparison of legal systems in Europe and the United States and the evolution of prison 
standards.17 This historical review will demonstrate why guidelines such as the Standard 
Minimum Rules were necessary to address important issues that affect all persons in 
detention and will show that good intentions toward prisoner welfare have been around 
 
17 LIORA LAZARUS, CONTRASTING PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE 
EXAMINATION OF GERMANY AND ENGLAND 5 (2004) (observing that a historical 
review is frequently relevant to a comparative law analysis because “‘it is not 
sufficient just to look at legal texts and rules to explain why legal systems are 
different.’”) (quoting J. Bell, Comparing Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2002) (A. Harding and E. Örücü, eds.)). 
just as long as there have been prisons.  This review reveals that, historically, good 
intentions have frequently been thwarted by the complexities of prison administration.  It 
will also help clarify why the legal systems in Europe and the United States have taken 
different approaches with respect to the Standard Minimum Rules.  Before discussing 
prison reform efforts, it is helpful to consider why imprisonment developed as a popular 
form of punishment in the first place. 
 A. Prison as Punishment  
Imprisonment has not always been the predominant form of punishment for 
criminal offenses as it is today.  Historically, the most common forms of punishment for 
serious misdeeds were banishment or exile, enslavement, corporal punishment, capital 
punishment, and, for lesser offenses, public humiliation or shame-based measures, such 
as placement in stocks.18 During early times, punishment-as-public-spectacle was used 
as a method to control crime.19 Although prisons, jails, and dungeons existed, they were 
used primarily to hold debtors or to detain those accused of an offense and were not the 
primary means for punishing offenders.20 Conditions in European jails during this time 
 
18 See IRA J. SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 70-71 (2nd ed. 
2001). 
19 TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 24 (6th ed. 2003); 
Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: Ancient and Medieval Worlds, in 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 3, 32 (Norval Morris and David J. Rothman, 
eds., 1998) (“Punishment in English criminal law was intended to be quick and 
public to serve as a deterrent to other crime.  Thus, forms of punishment ranged 
from shaming display – the pillory, mutilation, branding, public stocks, and 
ducking stools – to severe and aggravated capital punishments – hanging, 
drowning, burning, burial alive, or decapitation – and any of these could be 
preceded by the infliction of torments before the execution itself.”). 
20 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 79; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 27; Randall M. McGowen, The Well-Ordered 
were extremely poor: “Men, women, and children, healthy and sick, were locked up 
together; the strong preyed on the weak, sanitation was nonexistent, and disease was 
epidemic.”21 Still, incarceration was not typically imposed as punishment. 
 An early effort to use imprisonment for the purpose of correction or reformation 
stemmed from the so-called Protestant work ethic.  A forerunner of the modern prison, 
the workhouse evolved after the Protestant Reformation in the Sixteenth Century as a 
way to reform those who were “living in sin” or to put beggars and vagabonds to useful 
purpose.22 The prison workhouse regime “revolved around forced labor,” except on 
Sunday, which was reserved for religious instruction.23 The workhouse eventually 
became known as the “house of correction,” where the “inmates – primarily prostitutes, 
beggars, minor criminals, and the idle poor such as the orphaned and the sick – were to 
be disciplined and set to work.”24 
Advances in social thinking contributed to the abandonment of humiliating public 
spectacles and other cruel practices of punishment.  The Enlightenment, which occurred 
 
Prison, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 72 (Norval Morris and David J. 
Rothman, eds., 1998). 
21 CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 27. 
22 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 79. 
23 See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 64. 
24 CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 28; see also STEPHEN 
LIVINGSTONE, TIM OWEN, AND ALISON MCDONALD, PRISON LAW § 1.02 (3rd ed. 
2003) (describing the “local prison,” which included facilities called “bridewells” 
and “houses of correction (which existed to encourage vagabonds, beggars, and 
the ‘idle poor’ in the ways of work but which also housed minor offenders)” in 
contrast to the “local gaol,” which housed felons, misdemeanants, convicted or 
unconvicted, civil debtors, and, until 1867, those awaiting transportation to an 
Australian penal colony). 
in the 1700s, ushered in an era of reform that saw important changes in Western society’s 
thinking about religion, government, and science, as well as criminal laws and 
correctional practices.25 During this time, there was a shift away from corporal 
punishment and, in its place, the “penitentiary developed as an institution in which 
criminals could be isolated from the temptations of society, reflect on their offenses, and 
thus be reformed.”26 
The first prison in the United States, the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, was 
built in 1787, and expanded in 1790 to include a “Penitentiary House.”27 It featured a 
program advocated by the Quakers, who wanted to reform offenders while providing 
humane treatment.28 The Quakers opposed corporal punishment and believed that 
reformation was the only real purpose of punishment.29 They favored order and quiet in 
the prison environment to allow for true penitence.30 Under the Quaker regime, serious 
offenders were placed into solitary confinement until they could earn the privilege of 
 
25 See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 32. 
26 Id. 
27 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86-87; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 42. 
28 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 42 (Legislation passed in 
Pennsylvania in 1790, which was heavily influenced by the Quakers, 
contemplated the establishment of “an institution in which ‘solitary confinement 
to hard labor and a total abstinence from spiritous liquors will prove the most 
effectual means of reforming these unhappy creatures.’”) (quoting BLAKE 
MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 8 (1977)). 
29 See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 86. 
30 See id.
engaging in work, which was enjoyed by less serious offenders who were housed 
communally.31 
Crowded conditions at the Walnut Street Jail facility led to the construction of the 
first free-standing penitentiary.  To combat overcrowding, which was seen as detrimental 
to reform, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized construction of the Eastern 
Penitentiary in Cherry Hill, just outside of Philadelphia.32 Under the Pennsylvania 
system, inmates lived separately in a facility designed so that they “ate, slept, read their 
Bibles, received moral instruction, and worked in their cells” with limited interaction 
with each other, prison employees, or members of the public.33 They were allowed one 
hour of exercise per day.34 This program featured Quaker ideals of solitary confinement, 
work, and penitence.35 
The penitentiary movement in the United States actually stemmed from increased 
interest in prison conditions in Europe, which were deplorable, and modern thinking 
about crime and punishment.36 England, which could no longer export convicts to the 
 
31 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 43. 
32 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 87; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 39 (“Few Americans realize that their 
country gave the world its first penitentiary, an institution created to reform 
offenders within an environment designed to focus their full attention on their 
moral rehabilitation.”). 
33 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 87.  
34 See id.
35 See id. at 88. 
36 See REPORTS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY OF BOSTON, vol. 1, at x (1972).  
The Quakers of Philadelphia were greatly influenced by Italy’s Cesare Beccaria 
and his Essay on Crimes and Punishment, which was published in 1764.  See id.
American Colonies after the War of Independence in 1776, began to use old de-
commissioned ships or “hulks” to house convicts.37 A year later in 1777, prison reformer 
John Howard penned a scathing report that condemned prison conditions throughout 
Europe.38 In his book, The State of the Prisons, Howard reported that conditions in 
English and European jails in general were filthy, prisoners were often ill, as well as ill 
treated, and the system was corrupt.39 Howard’s book, which envisioned a healthy and 
efficient prison as an ideal, proved influential to the Quakers in America.40 
In spite of Howard’s revelations, Europe did not immediately embrace the 
penitentiary idea. England adopted a proposal of penal reform based on the penitentiary 
principle but ultimately decided that it would be cheaper to transport convicts to a penal 
colony in Australia.41 During this time, England had operated a dual system of local jails 
or “gaols” as well as a small number of “convict prisons.”42 At some point, American 
 
37 LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 1.03. 
38 See John Howard, The State of the Prisons, excerpts of which are reprinted in 
IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES at 7-29 (John Muncie and Richard 
Sparks, eds., 1991).  In addition to prisons in the “United Provinces” of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, Howard visited prisons in France, Flanders, Holland, 
Germany, Prussia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Poland.  See also 
McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 78-80 (discussing John 
Howard’s quest for healthy and efficient penal institutions and his influence as a 
prison reformer in Great Britain). 
39 See gen. Howard, supra note 38, at 7-29.  
40 See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 79, 86-88.  See also 
REPORTS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY OF BOSTON, supra note 36, vol. 1, at 
viii - xiv  (discussing early corrections in America and the Pennsylvania system). 
41 See John Hirst, The Australian Experience: The Convict Colony, in OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 236 (referencing the Penitentiary Act of 1779, which 
was influenced by John Howard’s 1777 treatise State of the Prisons). 
42 See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 1.02. 
experiments with the penitentiary began to influence reform efforts abroad.43 After it 
ceased transporting convicts to Australia and other outposts in 1857, England 
implemented a program of penal servitude in its place and enacted reforms in an effort to 
improve prison conditions in response to those described in John Howard’s book.44 
France would continue deporting recidivist convicts to penal colonies such as those found 
in French Guyana and New Caledonia until 1897.45 Eventually, other European countries 
would adopt the Pennsylvania model for their own penal systems.46 
Even as the Pennsylvania model grew in popularity in Europe, this system was 
soon abandoned in the United States for another that was developed in 1816 at the 
Auburn Prison in New York.  Although the “New York” or “Auburn” plan had 
similarities to the Pennsylvania scheme, there were important differences in correctional 
philosophy and economy.  The Auburn plan established a “congregate system” of 
confinement that, like the Pennsylvania model, emphasized discipline, obedience, and 
work.47 The Auburn system viewed prolonged isolation of the type found in the 
 
43 See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 88.  In comparison to 
the gallows, the use of imprisonment for punishment was viewed as reform.  See 
id.
44 See id. at §§ 1.04, 1.05. 
45 See Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent: Europe, 1865-1965, in 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 190-91. 
46 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 88; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 44 (“Most European visitors favored 
the Pennsylvania model, and the First International Prison Congress, held in 1846 
in Germany, endorsed it by a large majority.  The separate system was soon 
incorporated in correctional facilities in Germany, France, Belgium, and 
Holland.”). 
47 CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 44; see also David J. 
Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in OXFORD HISTORY 
Pennsylvania model cruel, however, and featured instead segregated confinement of each 
inmate at night only, work by prisoners during the day to pay the cost of imprisonment, 
and a rigidly enforced rule of silence to prevent inmates from “corrupting each other or 
plotting escapes and riots.”48 The Auburn system, which generally continued to regard 
reformation as the goal of penitentiary-style punishment, quickly became the model for 
prisons in the United States because it was less expensive to operate than the 
Pennsylvania model.49 At least twenty-nine states built Auburn-style prisons.50 
B. The Reformatory Movement and the 1870 Declaration of Principles  
Prison overcrowding and budget problems essentially doomed whatever noble 
intentions were found in the Pennsylvania and Auburn models of penitentiary 
management.  In that respect, overcrowding and understaffing made it impossible to 
 
OF THE PRISON at 105 (describing the congregate system of imprisonment 
implemented at the Auburn State Prison and then at Ossining, better known as 
Sing Sing, as opposed to the separate system found in Pennsylvania). 
48 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 89; see also Rothman, Perfecting 
the Prison, supra note 47, at 106 (noting that, unlike the Pennsylvania system, 
which confined prisoners to individual cells for their entire sentence of 
confinement, prisoners in an Auburn prison slept alone, one to a cell, but 
congregated during to work in prison shops where they were not allowed to speak 
to one another). 
49 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 90. 
50 See id. at 92; see also Rothman, Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 107 
(observing that almost all the states adopted the Auburn plan out of an 
“eager[ness] to realize the rehabilitative influence of the prison without incurring 
the greater costs required by the Pennsylvania system”).  For example, the “Walls 
Unit” in Huntsville, originally constructed as the first Texas prison in 1848, is an 
Auburn model prison.  See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 
19, at 46. 
enforce the disciplined structure of either system.51 In place of these regimented systems 
appeared brutal regimes that featured leased inmate labor and harsh punishment that often 
amounted to torture.52 Overcrowding became the rule, as did increasing prisoner 
unrest.53 Further contributing to the demise of early reformation efforts was the changing 
nature of the United States prison population, which included a rising percentage of 
immigrants.  Beginning in the 1860s, the type of inmate arriving at state penitentiaries 
also represented a “more hardened group” of murderers, robbers, and rapists.54 
The failure of the Pennsylvania and Auburn-plan prisons did not signal an end to 
Quaker-like concern for prisoner welfare in the United States.  Rather, it triggered an 
interest in implementing ideas for reform from abroad.  In 1870, penal reformers from the 
United States, Canada, South America, and Europe attended the first National Congress 
on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati, Ohio.55 The 1870 Congress 
resulted in the formation of an organization of correctional professionals, the National 
 
51 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92; see also Rothman, 
Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 109 (observing that prison officials were 
able to maintain the rule of silence prior to 1850 because overcrowding was not a 
problem before that time).  
52 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 45 (observing that, by 1840, “hard 
labor organized under the contract system achieved dominance in northeastern 
penitentiaries”). 
53 See Rothman, Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 112 (noting that, by 1866, 
even the Pennsylvania penitentiary at Philadelphia, which had once housed all 
inmates in solitary confinement, could no longer completely separate all of its 
inmates).  
54 See id. at 113. 
55 ANTHONY P. TRAVISONO AND MARY Q. HAWKES, BUILDING A VOICE: 125 YEARS 
OF HISTORY [THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION] 5(1995). 
Prison Association, which would later become known as the American Correctional 
Association (the “ACA”).56 As a result of this Congress, penal reformers in the United 
States embraced a new philosophy developed in Ireland, which featured a “mark” system 
of stages to punish offenders for their past crimes and to prepare offenders to return to 
society.57 Significantly, the Congress also resulted in a “Declaration of Principles of 
Prison Discipline” (the “1870 Declaration of Principles”), consisting of thirty-seven 
articles,58 which generally advocated “a philosophy of reformation as opposed to the 
adoption of punishment, progressive classification of prisoners based on the mark system, 
the indeterminate sentence, and the cultivation of the inmate’s self-respect.”59 
The 1870 Declaration of Principles have proven to be an influential and enduring 
model for prison reform.60 Based on principles from this model, which emphasized 
 
56 See id. at 6.  In 1941, the National Prison Association was renamed the American 
Prison Association, which became the American Correctional Association in 
1954.  See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 98, n.8. 
57 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92-95; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 48 (describing the “Irish or intermediate system” 
in which an inmate could earn “marks” to transfer through stages of solitary 
confinement to a modern precursor of the parole system) (emphasis in original). 
58 See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 205-19 (setting out the Principles 
in full). 
59 SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95 (quoting from the Declaration of 
Principles adopted by the newly-organized National Prison Association following 
a conference of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory 
Discipline in Cincinnati); see also CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS,
supra note 19, at 49 (describing the “Cincinnati Declaration” of 1870). 
60 See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 59, 121-22 (observing that the 
Declaration of Principles adopted in 1870 as been revised and reaffirmed by the 
ACA in 1930, in 1960, and again in 1970, with the basic structure still intact). 
rehabilitation, the first “reformatory” opened in Elmira, New York, in 1876.61 Between 
1877 and 1913, seventeen states built reformatories,62 which were designed to emphasize 
rehabilitative programs that featured educational and vocational training.63 Although the 
rehabilitative model resulted in a number of innovative programs, including the first 
parole system in the United States, the liberal ideals of reform were frustrated as the 
system eventually regressed to the harsh disciplinary methods of previous years.64 
C. Failure of Reform and the Crime Control Era  
Like the penitentiary system devised by the early Quakers, rehabilitative 
principles advanced by the reformatory movement had noble intentions.  Unfortunately, 
overcrowded and chaotic conditions of the type that led to the demise of the Pennsylvania 
and Auburn models also contributed to the failure of the reformatory movement.65 By 
the outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914, the reformatory movement was in full 
 
61 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95; see also Edgardo Rotman, 
The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE 
PRISON at 154-55 (reporting that the Elmira Reformatory in New York, which 
opened in 1876, featured a system based on ideas advanced at the 1870 National 
Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati). 
62 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 96. 
63 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 155-56 (discussing the Elmira 
model). 
64 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 96-97 (citing one report, which 
stated that reformatory inmates rejected the authority of their custodians resorted 
to “violence, revolts, escapes, drugs, arson, homosexuality [and] suicide,” 
resulting in a system that was “ineffective and brutal” rather than “benevolent”); 
CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 50 (outlining an 1893 
investigation into charges of brutality at the Elmira reformatory, “which revealed 
that the whip and solitary confinement were used there regularly”).  
65 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 156. 
decline.66 Conditions in the United States prison system also continued to deteriorate as 
corrupt, understaffed institutions struggled to maintain control of overcrowded facilities, 
often resorting to brutal, arbitrary forms of punishment, such as “lashing.”67 
The failure of the reformatory movement left a void that would be filled with 
institutions whose main purpose was to warehouse offenders.  The United States 
government opened its first federal prison in 1895, in Leavenworth, Kansas, for civilians 
convicted of violating federal law.68 The years between 1900 and 1950 saw an increase 
in this type of “Big House” prison, which resembled a military-style fortress, and the 
emergence of the United States Bureau of Prisons as federal prisoners grew in number.69 
With the rise of the Big House also came the proliferation of leased prison labor 
at state-run facilities, by which private entrepreneurs were allowed to exploit and profit 
from a cheap workforce that was organized into chain gangs.70 Prison farms, which also 
relied heavily on inmate labor, operated throughout the American south by 1917.71 These 
 
66 See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 50. 
67 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 156. 
68 FRANK SCHMALLEGER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TODAY 562 (8th ed. 2005); see also 
Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 166 (The first site chosen for the 
construction of a federal prison was Leavenworth, [Kansas].”) and 212 (“The 
Three Prisons Act of 1890 authorized building federal prisons at Leavenworth 
Kansas; Atlanta, Georgia; and McNeil Island, Washington.  Until 1890, those 
convicted of federal offenses were farmed out by contract to state institutions.”). 
69 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 116, 118-26; see also Rotman, 
Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 165 (commenting on the new “Big House” 
type of prison managed by professionals instead of short-term political appointees 
and designed to hold large populations of inmates, who were controlled with 
“stultifying routines, monotonous schedules, and isolation”). 
70 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 157. 
71 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 103. 
farms depended upon forced labor to grow their own food and harvest other crops, 
including cotton, in plantation-style fashion.72 In Mississippi, practically all inmates were 
forced to perform agricultural work at the infamous Parchman farm, which relied on 
surveillance performed by other prisoners — or trustees — who were notoriously cruel.73 
The self-sufficient “prison farm complex” flourished during the Great Depression of the 
1930s when states lacked funds for prison programs or improvements.74 Eventually, civil 
rights activists would target racist prison policies practiced at the prison farms, 
particularly in Mississippi.75 
The failure of the reformatory movement along with the rise of Big House 
penitentiaries and prison farms did not mean that there was a total loss of interest in 
prisoner rehabilitation in the United States.  In the 1930s, the growing influence of 
behavioral sciences in the fields of social work, psychiatry, and psychology led to a 
progressive reform movement in United States prisons.76 Under this “medical or 
therapeutic model,” the assumption was that “criminal offenders suffered from some 
form of physical, mental, or social pathology.”77 
72 See id. at 103-04. 
73 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 157. 
74 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 105. 
75 See id. at 105-06. 
76 See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 53. 
77 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 158-59 (outlining the 
psychotherapeutic model of prison reform underway in the United States at the 
turn of the 20th Century). 
Rapid social and political change in Europe also signaled changes in the treatment 
of prisoners.  European countries experienced fluctuations in the development and use of 
imprisonment as a model of punishment, as different nations maintained their own 
distinct prison systems.78 Some nations reacted to criticisms lodged against the use of 
imprisonment toward the end of the nineteenth century by experimenting with non-
custodial forms of punishment.79 Other nations expanded their prison systems.80 The 
gulag-style prisons in the former Soviet Union that featured forced prison labor,81 and the 
concentration camps utilized by Germany and Italy during World War II,82 are 
considered the most extreme examples of imprisonment in Europe during this period.83 
78 See Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent: Europe, 1865-1965, supra 
note 45, at 178.  
79 See id. at 179, 188-89 (describing the suspended sentence and supervised parole 
as “nonincarcerative punishments”); see also Norman Bishop, Aspects of 
European Penal Systems, in PROGRESS IN PENAL REFORM at 84-90 (Louis Blom-
Cooper, ed., 1974) (describing restrictions on, and alternative penalties to, 
imprisonment; these included suspended sentences, conditional sentences of 
probation, the imposition of special duties, community service, and administrative 
fines). 
80 See O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent: Europe, 1865-1965, supra note 45, at 
179. 
81 See, gen. ANNE APPLEBAUM, GULAG: A HISTORY (2004); MICHAEL JAKOBSEN,
ORIGINS OF THE GULAG: THE SOVIET PRISON CAMP SYSTEM, 1917-1934 (1993); 
see also FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, HOUSE OF THE DEAD (David McDuff, trans. 1985) 
(1860) (depicting an account based on the author’s four years in a Siberian 
convict prison). 
82 See, gen. NIKOLAUS WACHSMAN, HITLER’S PRISONS: LEGAL TERROR IN NAZI 
GERMANY (2004); DARIO MELOSSI AND MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND 
THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE [ITALIAN] PENITENTIARY SYSTEM (1980). 
83 See id.
Treatment of prisoners or, more accurately, the mistreatment of prisoners in 
Europe during World War I and World War II, elevated the notion of prison reform to a 
critical human rights issue.  Social change that followed after the end of World War II 
further renewed interest in rehabilitative institutions of the sort envisioned by United 
States penal reformers in 1870.84 In 1946, the American Correctional Association would 
publish the Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System.85 At the 
international level, these concerns also resulted in the codification of humanitarian 
principles found in the laws of war with the adoption of four Geneva Conventions in 
1949.86 
At the same time, the early 1950s were marred by a rise in prison violence, riots, 
and less serious rebellions such as sit down strikes, acts of escape, and self-mutilation by 
prisoners attempting to avoid harsh work requirements.87 The complaints that sparked 
these uprisings often concerned deficient prison facilities, “lack of hygiene and medical 
care, poor food quality, lack of treatment, and guard brutality.”88 These rebellions 
demonstrated that reforms promoted during the progressive era were largely rhetorical, 
frustrating the expectations of prisoners who fought — literally — for improved 
 
84 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 126. 
85 See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 98 (detailing the evolution of 
correctional standards from the early 1946 edition to the present).   
86 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 3. 
87 See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 168; see also Robert Adams, 
PRISON RIOTS IN BRITAIN AND THE USA 66-67 (1994) (noting that there were an 
unprecedented number of riots in American prisons occurring between 1951 and 
1953, as well as hunger strikes, and incidents in which prisoners slashed their own 
heel tendons in protest of brutal treatment). 
88 Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 168. 
conditions of confinement.89 Europe experienced a similar wave of prison riots and 
revolts that were also accompanied by demands from inmates for improved conditions to 
lessen the “pains of imprisonment.”90 
Prisoner unrest led to a renewed emphasis on rehabilitative treatment in the 
United States.  In 1954, the American Correctional Association issued a revised Manual 
of Correctional Standards.91 Consistent with the 1870 Declaration of Principles, the ACA 
continued to emphasize rehabilitation as the basic aim of prison institutions.92 The 
rehabilitative philosophy featured indeterminate sentences, the length of which depended 
on whether an offender’s  behavior indicated that he had been “cured” or reformed.93 
The rehabilitative model introduced the concept of inmate classification in an attempt to 
diagnose and treat criminals according to their needs.94 Likewise, treatment, therapy, and 
 
89 Id. 
90 Bishop, Aspects of European Penal Systems, supra note 79, at 91 (noting by way 
of example a number of riots in the Swedish and English prisons, in the Toul 
prison in France, and the Regina Coeli prison in Rome); see also Adams, PRISON 
RIOTS IN BRITAIN AND THE USA, supra note 87, at 117-29 (discussing prison riots 
in Britain in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, over prison conditions). 
91 See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 89.  As noted above, it was first 
published in 1946 as the MANUAL OF SUGGESTED STANDARDS FOR A STATE 
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM. It was revised again in 1959 and in 1966.  See id. at 99. 
92 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 128. 
93 See id. at 128-29. 
94 See id. at 129.  The “medical model” of corrections emphasized rehabilitation of 
offenders, which in turn increased the importance of inmate classification as the 
first step in prescribing any needed treatment regimen.  See CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 53-54; see also Rotman, Failure of 
Reform, supra note 61, at 159 (“[T]he new emphasis on diagnosis made 
classification a critical concern for the Progressive penal system.”). 
counseling programs began to find a place in prisons.95 It was during this time that the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council would approve the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,96 which are discussed in more detail below.  
 Notwithstanding the interest in rehabilitative treatment, another wave of prison 
violence erupted in the United States and in Europe in the early 1970s.  The infamous 
1971 riot at the Attica State Prison in New York, which resulted in thirty-two inmate 
deaths,97 coincided with disturbances in British prisons.98 Prisoners in France also rioted 
in early 1972, demanding better living conditions.99 After the Attica prison rebellion, 
violence began to escalate in prisons everywhere.100 Reformers began to advocate a 
model of corrections based on community reintegration, favoring shorter terms in prison 
or avoiding prison altogether in favor of probation.101 
At the same time that the humane treatment of prisoners became viewed as a 
human rights issue, control of crime increasingly was recognized as an important social 
issue.  Political climates changed in the late 1970s and 1980s, when advocates of crime 
 
95 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 129-33. 
96 Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 5. 
97 See NEW YORK STATE COMM’N ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF 
THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972). 
98 Besharov and Mueller, The Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners: A 
Comparison, supra note 13, at 839, 839 & n.1. 
99 See id.
100 See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 141. 
101 See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 56. 
control called for an end to the rehabilitative era in imprisonment.102 Citing its lack of 
effect on rates of recidivism, the crime control model ushered in a host of measures 
designed to get tough on crime, such as the increased use of determinate sentences 
designed to incarcerate offenders for longer periods.103 In the United States federal 
system, parole was abolished.104 The increased emphasis on imprisonment as 
punishment caused an explosion of incarceration rates in the United States, which 
remains under the crime-control model today.105 As crime rates have also increased in 
Europe, so too have prison populations there, although few European countries apart 
from the United Kingdom have emulated United States crime-control policies.106 
A modern extension of the crime-control movement has been the development of 
international tribunals and the corresponding need to punish violators of international 
criminal law, including those who have committed war crimes and other atrocities.  The 
need for an international prison is one of recent vintage.  There are two detention 
facilities presently operating in connection with proceedings pending before international 
 
102 See id. at 56. 
103 See id. at 57. 
104 The parole statutes were repealed by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027.  Chapter II of this 
legislation, entitled the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, took effect on November 
1, 1987.  See Sentencing Reform Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. 99-217, § 4, 99 
Stat. 1728 (1985).  Since that time, the United States Parole Commission has 
retained only limited jurisdiction over those defendants who committed their 
offenses prior to November 1, 1987, among others, and those prisoners transferred 
to the United States pursuant to a treaty for the purpose of serving a foreign 
sentence.   
105 See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 56-59. 
106 See PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 99 (Michael Tonry, ed., 2001). 
criminal tribunals for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.107 
Prisoners sentenced by these tribunals are transferred to countries that agree to take them 
and so they are eventually incarcerated in national prisons.108 These national prison 
facilities, nevertheless, are bound to comply with international standards for the detention 
of these prisoners.109 
II. HISTORY OF THE STANDARD MINIMUM RULES 
As indicated in the preceding historical overview of prison reform, the Standard 
Minimum Rules are linked to an era of increased concern for human rights and a time of 
growing interest in the promise of rehabilitation.  The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which codified the laws of war in light of the strife occasioned by international conflict, 
included specific protections for prisoners of war.110 Outside the prisoner-of-war context, 
 
107 See Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 
357-58 (2005) (referencing war crime tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and detention facilities located in Scheveningen near the Hague and in 
Arusha, Tanzania). 
108 See id. at 358. 
109 See id. 
110 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3 (Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War).  Article 3, which is common to all four of the Geneva 
Conventions, hence its designation as “Common Article 3,” provides that 
“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely” and prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” as well as 
“[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment[.]” Article 27 requires that all prisoners of war must be treated with 
“respect for their persons” and “their honour,” and further that “[t]hey shall at all 
times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of 
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity[.]”   Article 32 
prohibits “any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering . . . 
of protected persons,” which extends “not only to murder, torture, corporal 
punishment, [and] mutilation . . . , but also to any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilian or military agents.” According to Article 147, “torture 
or inhuman treatment,” and acts “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury 
however, international interest in the treatment of offenders became linked to efforts 
associated with the administration of justice and the prevention of crime as a social issue.  
As the following discussion shows, the drafting and approval of the Standard Minimum 
Rules represents an equally earnest attempt to address human rights goals while in pursuit 
of a social agenda to eradicate crime at an international level.  
 A. Drafting and Approval of the Standard Minimum Rules  
As noted above, there was an early effort to articulate guidelines for the treatment 
of prisoners in 1870, with the Declaration of Principles outlined at the inaugural National 
Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati.111 The first effort to 
adopt international prison standards was made by an entity affiliated with the League of 
Nations.  The Standard Minimum Rules were first developed in 1926 by the International 
Penitentiary Commission and revised in 1933 by the successor of that entity, the 
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission or IPPC.112 The League of Nations 
approved these rules in 1934 before dissolving.113 The IPPC would prepare a final draft 
 
to body or health” are included among the type of conduct considered to be 
“[g]rave breaches” of the Convention.   
111 See SILVERMAN: CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 49. 
112 ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROGRAM: FORMULATION OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR 
IMPLEMENTATION 11-12, 98 (1994).  The United States participated in the first 
International Prison Congress held in London in 1872, and in future international 
prison congresses held by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 
but it never became a member nation.  See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 
55, at 76. 
113 See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9 at 284. 
See also CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 12 & n.26 (citing League of Nations Docs. C. 
620.M.2411930.IV; A.44.1933.IV; A.45.1934.IV. Annex).  The League of 
in 1951 on behalf of the successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations, which 
counted human rights as among its primary goals.114 
After World War II, nations again attempted to maintain international peace and 
security by joining together.  The “trauma of the war” that lasted from 1939 through 1945 
would usher in fundamental social changes and an “urgent interest at the international 
level in human rights and the treatment of prisoners.”115 To further these goals, the 
United Nations was formed in 1945.116 Article 55 of the United Nations Charter 
specifically requires that all signatories “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.”117 Presumably, this mandate extends to all persons, 
including those imprisoned following a criminal conviction or for any other reason.   
 In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution 
called the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).118 The UDHR primarily 
 
Nations recommended that states adopt the Standard Minimum Rules and 
proposed a regular reporting process regarding their application and on prison 
reforms achieved.  See id. at 12, n. 26. 
114 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 98-99. 
115 Kenneth Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical 
Aspects, in IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 205 (John Muncie and 
Richard Sparks, eds., 1991). 
116 Charter of the United Nations, T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043 (June 
26, 1945). The United States is a party to the UN Charter and a permanent 
member of its most powerful organ, the Security Council.  See id. at Art. 23. 
117 Id. 
118 UDHR, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), 
available at http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html.  
promotes the general right to human dignity and security,119 as well as several specific 
rights associated with the administration of justice, including the prohibition against 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition against 
arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and 
the prohibition against ex post facto laws.120 These rights would be solidified in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),121 which is another 
important multinational convention adopted following World War II that is designed to 
advance principles found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which also 
contains specific guarantees applicable to prisoners and the administration of justice.122 
To further advance the human rights and social goals outlined in the UN Charter 
and the UDHR, the United Nations initiated a program aimed at crime prevention and 
criminal justice administration.123 The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Program is operated by one of the principal organs of the United Nations, the 
 
119 See id. at Article 3, 12, 17, 28. 
120 See id. Articles 5, 9, 10, and 11. 
121 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
entered into force March 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States June 8, 
1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).   See S. Rep. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (setting out the Senate’s advice and consent to 
ratification).  
122 ICCPR, Art. 6 (restricting the use of capital punishment); Art. 7 (prohibiting 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); Art. 8 
(prohibiting arbitrary arrest or detention); Art. 10 (requiring humane treatment 
and “respect for the inherent dignity” of the human person and a penitentiary 
system whose essential aim shall be reformation and social rehabilitation); Art. 14 
(guaranteeing the presumption of innocence and minimum levels of due-process-
type trial rights). 
123 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 10. 
Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC,124 with the recognition that crime is regarded 
as a core social issue.125 At its formation, the United Nations articulated two kinds of 
obligations on states in the area of crime and criminal justice: (1) safeguarding “the right 
of the people of the world to enjoy domestic tranquillity and security of person and 
property without the encroachment of criminal activity[;]” and (2) operating “efficient 
criminal justice systems that do not deprive citizens of their rights.”126 
One of the first steps taken to foster the program’s goal of encouraging humane 
criminal justice systems was the adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules at the First 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 
1955.127 The Standard Minimum Rules were approved by the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council in 1957.128 The approval language demonstrates that the Standard 
Minimum Rules were not intended to be legally binding,129 and the express terms of the 
 
124 U.N. Charter Art. 7(1) (describing the principal organs of the United Nations). 
125 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 12. 
126 Id. at 11 (quotation omitted). 
127 See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9 at 284.  
The First Congress adopted a revision of the draft prepared by the IPPC before its 
dissolution in 1951.  See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 99.  The IPPC had been holding 
regular congresses in the correctional field since 1885.  See id. at 19. 
128 See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9 at 284. 
129 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 134 (setting out the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council resolution approving the Standard Minimum Rules and 
“recommend[ing]” that “favourable consideration be given to their adoption and 
application in the administration of penal and correctional institutions”) (quoting 
E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess. Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/3048 (1957)).  There have been suggestions of elevating the Standard Minimum 
Rules seek only to establish “what is generally accepted as being good principle and 
practice in the treatment of prisoners and the management of institutions.”130 The overall 
purpose of the Standard Minimum Rules was to “inject the humanitarian spirit of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the correctional system without 
compromising public safety or prison security.”131 To accomplish this humanitarian goal, 
the Standard Minimum Rules emphasize humane treatment and rehabilitation, stating that 
the only justification for imprisonment is “to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his 
return to society, the offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding and self-
supporting life.”132 
The Standard Minimum Rules contain numerous substantive provisions regarding 
prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners that reflect the concerns of penal 
reformers such as the ones outlined above in the historical overview in part one of this 
paper.133 In all, the Standard Minimum Rules consist of ninety-five provisions.134 A
Rules to a legally-binding convention, but the idea has failed to catch on.  See 
CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 134-35. 
130 Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 5, Rule 1. 
131 Besharov and Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 840 (quoting the 
Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Working Paper, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/CG2/WP.3 at 8 (1968)). 
132 Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 169 (quoting Article 58 of the 
Standard Minimum Rules). 
133 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 148.  Indeed, the word “Treatment” was selected for 
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners for its ambiguity to 
capture the dual concern of reformers for human rights and to reflect the endeavor 
to “‘cure’ the offender from re-offending.”  Id. 
review of the provisions shows that the range of the Standard Minimum Rules is broad, 
regulating everything from the use of corporal punishment to the provision of clean 
sheets.  As the name implies the Standard Minimum Rules establish minimum standards 
for a wide variety of functions performed by prison and jail administrators, including 
prisoner registration or intake and classification, accommodations, personal hygiene, 
clothing and bedding, food, exercise and sport, medical services, as well as 
communication with the outside world, the availability of books, religious services and 
instruction, and the use of force.135 
The Standard Minimum Rules and their broad provisions were ambitious for their 
time.  They clearly respond to problems highlighted by the historical review of prison 
reform, particularly with regard to issues affecting prisoners’ health, dignity, and prospect 
for rehabilitation.  Because of the noble nature of the themes found in the Standard 
Minimum Rules, the United Nations Economic and Social Council encouraged states to 
implement them to further the human rights and social interests of crime prevention and 
fair administration of justice.  In spite of their noble goals, the implementation process 
has met with a surprising level of ambivalence by domestic nation states.  
 B. Implementation Process 
134 See Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 5.  The Standard Minimum Rules are 
organized into three parts: Rules 1 through 5 are “Preliminary Observations”; 
Rules 6 through 55 (“Part I”) are “Rules of General Application”; Rules 55 
through 95 (“Part II”) are “Rules Applicable to Special Categories.” See CLARK,
UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 149 (making this distinction). In light of their non-binding 
intent, it is a misnomer to call these provisions “rules,” when they are perhaps 
more appropriately termed guidelines.  
135 See Standard Minimum Rules, supra, note 5, at ¶¶ 7-26, 37-43. 
From its inception, the implementation process for the Standard Minimum Rules 
has been hampered by their advisory, non-binding character, among other things.  As one 
commentator has observed, “implementation” has not been defined in a United Nations 
instrument, but it typically consists of two elements: (1) a call for domestic incorporation 
(“it connotes an effort to encourage states to apply international norms in their domestic 
laws and practices”); and (2) a mechanism to enforce or to monitor compliance (“it 
suggests some kind of international machinery to supervise or follow-up on the 
exhortations to do so”).136 The United Nations has encouraged member states to adopt 
the Standard Minimum Rules, but its mechanism for enforcing them is nonexistent and 
the means of evaluating state compliance has left much to be desired.   
 The implementation machinery employed for the Standard Minimum Rules 
initially featured data collation and dissemination of information.137 This process was 
evidently selected in an effort to encourage states to make a self-assessment of their 
prison systems.138 After approving the Standard Minimum Rules in 1957, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council requested progress reports on implementation and 
began sending out questionnaires or surveys.139 Surveys were sent out in 1967, 1974, 
1979, 1984, and 1989, so that the results would coincide with the regularly held United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which has 
 
136 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 232. 
137 Id. at 233. 
138 See id. (outlining implementation measures taken in the late 1950s, which were  
deemed “cathartic” for participating states and useful, perhaps, to assess states’ 
efforts in light of community practice). 
139 Id. at 234.   
convened every five years since its initial meeting in 1955 to address international issues 
related to criminal justice.140 
The response to the surveys was less than enthusiastic.  Of the 123 states that had 
joined the United Nations by 1967,141 only 44 replied to the initial survey distributed that 
same year.142 As a result of this lukewarm response, the United Nations General 
Assembly issued two resolutions in the 1970s, asking member nations to incorporate the 
Standard Minimum Rules into their respective domestic penal laws.143 There were 
discussions at the Fourth United Nations Congress in 1970 about redrafting and updating 
the Standard Minimum Rules.144 The only significant update that resulted, however, was 
 
140 See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 306; 
see also Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 453 (1975) 
(reviewing the initial surveys).  Delegates of the American Correctional 
Association attended the first United Nations Crime Conference and they continue 
to participate in these regularly held conferences.  See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES,
supra note 55, at 89-90. 
141 See http://www.un.org/overview/growth.htm (providing an overview of the 
growth of UN member states from 1945 to present). 
142 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 234.  
143 See G.A. Res. 3144, Dec. 14, 1973, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 85; 
G.A. Res. 2858, Dec. 20, 1971, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess. Supp. No. 29, at 94. 
144 See Besharov & Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 847 (citing The 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in the Light of Recent 
Developments in the Correctional Field iv, 2-5, Report of Section III, Severein-
Carlos Versele, Rapporteur, Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Kyoto, Japan, 17-26 August 1970)). 
the addition of one rule designed to extend protections to pretrial detainees and persons 
detained without charges.145 
The 1974 survey yielded an improved return with 62 responses from United 
Nations member states.146 In 1979, however, there was a low number of 38 responses 
from United Nation members, which had grown by then to 152 states.147 No further 
effort was made to encourage implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules until the 
1980s.  In 1984, the Economic and Social Council of the UN approved a set of 
Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners.148 Beginning in 1984, members of the United Nations were 
required to report to the Secretary General every five years on the extent of 
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules, the application of these rules, and the 
“factors and difficulties, if any, affecting their implementation.”149 In 1984 there was an 
increase in the number of survey responses to 62 member states, which was up from the 
 
145 N.S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 
(2nd ed. 1999) (citing ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) (13 May 1977) (adding article 
95 to ensure that persons arrested or imprisoned without charge should benefit 
from most provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules). 
146 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 234, n.8. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. at 238 (citing Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, Procedures for 
the Effective Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners, May 25, 1984, E.S.C. Res. 1984/47, U.N. ESCOR, 76th Sess., Supp. 
No. 1, at 29, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84). 
149 Id. at 238-39. 
38 replies received in 1979,150 but still failed to demonstrate wide acceptance by a UN 
membership that had grown to over 150 nations. 
 The year 1984 also saw the fruition of the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the 
“CAT”).151 Of great relevance to prisoners, the CAT recognizes the “inherent dignity of 
the human person” and the international prohibition against torture and otherwise cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.152 Parties were required to submit an 
initial report within one year, outlining steps taken to implement the treaty’s specific 
articles,153 and to make subsequent reports every four years.154 The CAT has something 
 
150 See id. at 234, n.8. 
151 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “CAT”), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 100-200 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
152 Article 1 of the CAT prohibits “torture,” defined as: 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
 
Article 16 of the CAT prohibits  “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment” that does not rise to the level of torture, but offers no definition as to 
what kind of treatment fits within this prohibition.  The United States ratified the 
CAT on April 18, 1988, and it has been in effect since November 20, 1994. 
153 Reports are required by Article 19 of the CAT.  The initial report by the United 
States includes an overview of its criminal justice system, the legal mechanisms 
protecting prisoners, and a discussion concerning conditions of confinement. See 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, Initial Reports of States Parties Due 
that the Standard Minimum Rules do not — a means for investigation and the possibility 
of some kind of sanction, even if it is only a denunciation of practices.  In that regard, if 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee receives “reliable information” that torture 
is being “systematically practised in the territory of a state party,” it may undertake a 
confidential inquiry.155 Parties that accede to a proposed Optional Protocol to the CAT 
may be subject to a system of regular inspections for places of detention by a 
subcommittee.156 
The United Nations has expended additional efforts to extend protection tailored 
to the interests of pretrial detainees or “remand” prisoners.  On December 9, 1988, the 
United Nations General Assembly approved the “Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.”157 The Body of Principles 
expressly applies to imprisoned persons, defined as those who have been “deprived of 
personal liberty as a result of conviction for an offense.”158 Chiefly concerned with the 
plight of political prisoners and those arbitrarily deprived of their liberty and held 
 
in 1995 Addendum: United States of America, at ¶¶ 22-53, 138-155, 
CAT/C/28/Add. 5 (9 Feb. 2000), available at: http://www.unhchr.ch. 
154 See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 3.53 
– 3.54 (outlining the CAT reporting system). 
155 CAT, Art. 20.  To date, only two such inquiries have been undertaken, in regard 
to Egypt and Turkey.  See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW,
supra note 24, at § 3.53. 
156 GA Res. A/Res/57/199, 18 Dec. 2002. 
157 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
297, U.N. Doc. A/43/49, 1988).  
158 Id. 
incommunicado, the Body of Principles contains procedural safeguards not found in the 
Standard Minimum Rules.159 
In spite of these positive developments on behalf of prisoners in the mid-1980s, 
interest in the Standard Minimum Rules continued to wane.  In response to the 1989 
survey, only 49 states replied to the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s 
questionnaire on implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules, which represented less 
than one-third of the then-existing United Nations membership.160 The low level of 
responses to surveys distributed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council has 
made it difficult to reach general conclusions about world-wide implementation, other 
than the determination that there is a definite lack of fervor for the Standard Minimum 
Rules.161 
In a further effort to advance the “long-standing concern of the United Nations for 
the humanization of the criminal justice and the protection of human rights,” the General 
Assembly passed a resolution in 1990, containing a list of Basic Principles for the 
 
159 See Tulio Treves, The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of Detained or 
Imprisoned Persons, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 581-86 (1990) (outlining procedural 
applicable during interrogations, after arrest, and detention on a criminal charge). 
160 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 234, n.8.  In 1989, the UN had grown to include 159 
member states.  A helpful chart depicting an annual overview of the UN’s growth 
from 1945 to present is found at www.un.org/overview/growth.htm (last visited 
April 29, 2006). 
161 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 165 (“Neither the volume of responses to the surveys nor the 
picture that emerges from them gives any impression of vast enthusiasm among 
the Foreign Offices and Justice Departments of the World.”). 
Treatment of Prisoners.162 It is intended to serve as a “declaration on the human rights of 
prisoners,” and to encourage members of the United Nations to fully implement the 
Standard Minimum Rules.163 Also in 1990, the Eighth United Nations Crime Congress 
attempted to require additional reports regarding the adoption of some other criminal 
justice model rules.164 Reporting had ceased altogether by 1993, however, as the result of 
apathy and limited resources.165 
One factor that apparently has complicated the reporting process is the 
proliferation of standards and human rights treaties.  Many of the provisions found in the 
 
162 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, 45 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 199, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), reprinted in THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS 108-111 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ed., 1994). 
163 Id. 
164 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 255.   In addition to reporting requirements for the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, states were asked to 
report on implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial 
Measures (the “Tokyo Rules”), the Guidelines for Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency (the “Riyadh Guidelines”), the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, the Basic Principles on the Use 
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Basic Principles on the 
Role of Lawyers, and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.  See id.
165 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 259.  The next survey was reportedly planned for 
1993.  See Report of the Secretary General, Eighth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Implementation of the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ¶ 110(e) 
A/CONF.144/11 (19 July 1990).  The proceedings of the Ninth United Nations 
Crime Congress contain no report from the Secretary General and no explanation 
for why a survey was not done.  Since the Eighth Crime Congress in 1990, there 
has been no further report from the UN Secretary General on implementation of 
the Standard Minimum Rules.  For a link to reports presented at all of the United 
Nations Crime Congresses since 1955, see the website for the American Society 
of Criminology, www.asc41.com.
Standard Minimum Rules overlap with those found in other instruments, such as the 
above-referenced CAT, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or 
ICCPR.166 Reports by state parties to these other international conventions include an 
enquiry into the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules.167 In answer to 
concerns about the utility of the reporting regime, the United Nations Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice recommended revising its information-gathering 
process in 1993.168 The first reporting cycle for this new process extended from 1996 to 
2002, to enable member states sufficient time to provide replies for consideration by the 
Commission.169 As of the Eleventh Annual Crime Congress in 2005, however, the 
reports received “could not provide a precise account of the impact produced” by United 
Nations standards, norms, and guidelines.170 Accordingly, it appears that the United 
 
166 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
entered into force March 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States June 8, 
1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).   See S. Rep. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (setting out the Senate’s advice and consent to 
ratification).  
167 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 273 (observing that regular reports required by the 
ICCPR include an inquiry into the implementation of the Standard Minimum 
Rules); see also LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 
24, at §§ 3.49 – 3.50, 3.53 – 3.54 (discussing the state reporting requirement 
under the ICCPR and the CAT in relation to prison conditions). 
168 See United Nations, Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Making Standards Work: Fifty Years of Standard-Setting in 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, at ¶¶ 25-26, A/CONF.203/8, Bangkok, 
18-25 April 2005, available at www.asc41.com (citing E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.4). 
169 Id. at ¶ 26. 
170 Id.  No information is given in the working paper about how many replies the 
Commission received from member states. 
Nations has gone back to the drawing board to develop a workable information-gathering 
system.171 
C. Generalizations About the Status of the Standard Minimum Rules 
Some generalizations about the Standard Minimum Rules are possible even in 
light of lackluster compliance with the survey process.  Interpreting the “sparse” results 
of the 1989 survey, to which there were only 49 replies, one commentator has observed 
that provisions 6 and 7 of the Standard Minimum Rules (emphasizing the principle of 
non-discrimination and establishing a registration requirement for recording prisoners’ 
names) are the most widely accepted.172 There is reportedly “widespread” support for 
provision 34, which places limits on the use of restraints, and “solid” support for 
provision 31, which prohibits corporal punishment.173 The picture of implementation for 
the remaining provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules, however, appears sketchy.174 
It is fair to conclude from the underwhelming nature of the 1989 survey response that the 
overall value of the information disclosed is, at best, “debatable.”175 
In spite of the dispirited implementation efforts for the Standard Minimum Rules 
as a whole, these guidelines have found utility in conjunction with other international 
efforts to promote better treatment for prisoners.  In making a comparison with other 
 
171 Id. at ¶¶ 27-33, 47 (outlining various efforts to reform and streamline the 
reporting process). 
172 See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 168. 
173 Id. at 169. 
174 Id. at 170-74 (containing a table that illustrates the extent of implementation 
based on the uneven responses by 49 states to the 1989 survey). 
175 Id. at 177-78. 
international instruments, a commentator has observed that the prohibitions of corporal 
punishment found in provision 31 of the Standard Minimum Rules, as with the 
prohibition against all cruel, inhuman, or degrading forms of punishment, are more than 
merely advisory; rather, such prohibitions “reflect legal obligations” as a matter of 
customary international law.176 Other provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules, by 
contrast, are more easily seen as non-binding guidelines, such as provision 40, which 
“requires a library ‘adequately stocked with both recreational and instructional 
books.’”177 Acknowledging that not every provision may constitute a legal obligation, the 
Standard Minimum Rules have served an important interpretive purpose:  
Although not every rule may constitute a legal obligation, it is reasonably 
clear  that the Standard Minimum Rules can provide guidance in 
interpreting the general rule against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  Thus, serious non-compliance with some rules 
or widespread non-compliance with some others may well result in a level 
of ill-treatment sufficient to constitute violations of the general rule 
[prohibiting cruel treatment].178 
The Standard Minimum Rules can also provide guidance in interpreting the duty of 
humane treatment and the respect for human dignity and the specific requirement found 
 
176 RODLEY, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
145, at 280-81.  
177 Id. (quoting Standard Minimum Rule 40). 
178 Id. 
in Article 10 of the ICCPR,179 which states that “the penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social 
rehabilitation.”180 Using the Standard Minimum Rules as an interpretive guideline for 
norms found in other instruments may ameliorate the poor record of domestic 
implementation. 
 In view of the uneven implementation process, it has been suggested that 
converting the Standard Minimum Rules to a convention or a series of conventions would 
enhance their status.181 This is unlikely to happen in view of the difficulty of achieving 
international consensus, especially on issues closely related to internal, domestic matters.  
It has been implied that the Standard Minimum Rules are so well-recognized as 
international standards that a convention is not needed to achieve informal but “effective 
local judicial recognition.”182 In the absence of a binding convention, however, states 
remain free to implement their own standards regarding the treatment of prisoners or 
simply to elect to do nothing.  So far, efforts to evaluate domestic implementation of the 
 
179 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
entered into force March 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States June 8, 
1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).   See S. Rep. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (setting out the Senate’s advice and consent to 
ratification).  
180 RODLEY, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
145, at 281 (citing 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights — 
The Greek Case 468 (1969)).  
181 See The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in the Light of 
Recent Developments in the Correctional Field, ¶ 50, Working Paper by the 
Secretariat, 4 U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, 1, 13-18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 43/3 (1970)), reprinted in LILLICH &
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 296-300. 
182 Id. at ¶ 52. 
Standard Minimum Rules, as outlined above, have failed to provide a clear picture of 
whether  states have opted for the former or the latter. 
 Undeterred by the lack of fervor for the Standard Minimum Rules shown in the 
survey replies, the United Nations continues to push in earnest for humane treatment of 
prisoners.  In recognition of the “pioneering role” of the Standard Minimum Rules and 
the need for a binding instrument, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice adopted a draft “Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners” in 
2003.183 The proposed Charter outlines the following fundamental rights: (1) the right to 
inherent dignity; (2) the right to separation, classification, and different legal treatment; 
(3) the right to humane accommodation; (4) the right to decent food; (5) the right to 
health and medical care; (6) the right to legal consultation, prompt and fair trial, equitable 
sentencing, including non-custodial sanctions; (7) the right to independent inspections; 
and (8) the right to reintegration.184 The proposed Charter does not announce anything 
new.  The rights outlined therein simply regurgitate provisions found in existing 
instruments such as the Standard Minimum Rules, the Basic Principles for the Treatment 
of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, the UDHR, and the ICCPR.185 The resolution accompanying 
the proposed draft Charter of Fundamental Rights invites consideration by member states 
of the United Nations and other organizations in preparation for the Eleventh United 
 
183 United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, For 
Human Dignity - Towards the Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners, 12th 
Sess., Vienna, 13-22 May 2003, E/CN.15/2003, available at 
www.asc.41.com/un3.htm. 
184 Id. 
185 See id. 
Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which was held in Bangkok, 
Thailand, in 2005.186 At that Conference, the United Nations celebrated the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Standard Minimum Rules and their important role in improving the 
administration of criminal justice by influencing the formulation of national or domestic 
policies.187 No mention was made in that report, however, about the adoption of the 
proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners. 
 The well-intentioned efforts of the United Nations have not been ignored 
completely and there are undoubtedly some good explanations for any particular 
country’s seeming ambivalence towards implementing the Standard Minimum Rules for 
domestic use.  As explored further below, the United States and Europe make use of the 
Standard Minimum Rules in different ways.  In that respect, the United States has been 
characterized as an example of the “limited success” enjoyed by the Standard Minimum 
Rules, as only few references are found among the reported cases and the “enormous” 
body of literature that has addressed the “outpouring of prisoner litigation” in this 
country.188 Europe, by contrast, which has formally adopted the Standard Minimum 
Rules by creating its own set of European Prison Rules, is depicted as an optimistic 
example of the inspirational role that the Standard Minimum Rules have played.189 The 
 
186 See id.
187 Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
Making Standards Work: Fifty Years of Standard-Setting in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, A/CONF.203/8, Bangkok, 18-25 April 2005, available at 
www.asc41.com. 
188 CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 177-78. 
189 See id. at 179. 
following section of the paper compares legal regimes for prisoners’ rights in Europe, 
which has implemented the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale by adopting its own 
European Prison Rules, with the system in the United States, which has developed 
standards of its own.  
III. LEGAL REGIMES FOR PROTECTING PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 
Just as with the historical overview of penal reform, the legal systems for 
protecting prisoners rights in the United States and Europe are fundamentally different 
and involve distinctive concerns.  Europe represents an “Old World” where states have 
long histories and some have equally ancient prison facilities.190 The democracy in place 
in the United States is only just over 225 years old and has seen nowhere near the 
political upheaval as the so-called European Union, which continues to add members as it 
 
190 For example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has found that the 
following conditions at Spain’s ancient Metilla prison violated the right to human 
dignity protected by Article 10(1) of the ICCPR, where the complainant had been 
held in — 
 
a 500-year old prison, virtually unchanged, infested with rats, lice, 
cockroaches and diseases; 30 persons per cell, among them old men, 
women, adolescents and an eight-month-old baby; no windows, but only 
steel bars open to the cold and the wind; high incidence of suicide, self-
mutilation, violent fights and beatings; human [feces] all over the floor as 
the toilet, a hole in the ground, was flowing over; sea water for showers 
and often for drink as well; urine-soaked blankets and mattresses to sleep 
on in spite of the fact that the supply rooms were full of new bed linen, 
clothes, etc. 
 
RODLEY, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
145, at 291 (quoting Griffin v. Spain, 493/1992, UN doc. CCPR/C/57 (1996), 
para. 3.1).  The Human Rights Committee further found that, because the 
complainant was subjected to these conditions for over seven months, the 
conditions amounted to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment.  
Id. 
struggles to adopt uniform standards.191 This section of the paper will review the 
prisoners’ rights regime in Europe and the United States in an effort to determine how 
differences in the legal systems have resulted in objectively different levels of esteem for 
the Standard Minimum Rules.   
 A. Prison Standards and Prisoners’ Rights in Europe  
As the epicenter of both world wars, Europe has had an acute interest in 
improving human rights. The Council of Europe, which was formed immediately after 
World War II in 1949, has grown from ten to forty-six member states.192 In addition to 
the domestic legal systems of these members, Europe has developed regional 
mechanisms for vindicating human rights, including the rights of prisoners.  Europe, in 
particular, responded to the United Nations’ encouragement by adopting the Standard 
Minimum Rules outright in 1973.193 The European Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, which were eventually revised in 1987 and renamed the 
European Prison Rules,194 work in tandem with two other important regional instruments 
 
191 See Floyd Norris, It is European, But It Is Not A Union, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 
2006, at C1. 
192 PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 
(2nd ed. 2005).  Membership has grown in the 1990s, with the addition of several 
central and eastern European states, including Bulgaria (1992), the Czech 
Republic (1992), Slovakia (1992), Poland (1993), Romania (1994), Slovenia 
(1994), Lithuania (1995), Albania (1996), Andorra (1996), Estonia (1996), 
Ukraine (1997), Croatia (1997), Moldova (1997), the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (1997), Latvia (1997), Russia (1998), Georgia (1999), Armenia 
(2002), Azerbaijan (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002), Serbia and 
Montenegro (2004).  See id. at 7. 
193 Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, Resolution No.  73(5) (Jan. 19, 1973).   
194 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States (Strasbourg, Feb. 12, 1987). 
that affect the rights of prisoners in Europe: the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention”);195 and the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (the “European Torture Convention”).196 Each facet of the European 
system is discussed briefly below to describe how it protects prisoners’ rights. 
 1. The European Prison Rules 
The instrument that most directly affects the management of Europe’s prisons is 
the European Prison Rules.  The history and evolution of the European Prison Rules 
reflects that Europe, as a region, accepted seriously the challenge posed by the United 
Nations to improving human rights and the treatment of prisoners.  In 1973, the regional 
European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe adopted its own 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.197 As originally adopted, the 
European Standard Minimum Rules closely paralleled the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules, but featured a “narrower framework” designed to reflect a “more liberal 
common denominator than the one established at world level.”198 Thus, the European 
version adopted “was envisaged as giving [the Standard Minimum Rules] a European 
emphasis and reflecting the particular need and circumstances of the prison systems of 
 
195 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950). 
196 Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 126 (26 Nov. 1987). 
197 Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, Resolution No.  73(5) (Jan. 19, 1973).  
198 LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 314 
(quoting Council of Europe Activities in the Field of Crime Problems 1956-1976, 
at 45 (1977)).   
the member states of the Council of Europe.”199 Like the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules, the European version included a reporting requirement every five years 
on member states’ progress with implementation.200 
Unlike the Standard Minimum Rules, which have not been revised significantly 
since 1955, the European rules have evolved and changed with time.  From the inception 
of the European rules, the drafters aspired to establish “a new, more creative and 
distinctively European model.” 201 Noting “significant social trends and changes in regard 
to prison treatment and management,” the Council of Europe adopted a revision to its 
version of the Standard Minimum Rules in 1987.202 In doing so, the Council of Europe 
consciously decided to advance emerging philosophical ideas that were a distinct product 
of the “major post-war phenomena of a social and political nature, as well as the impact 
of the developing thought and practice that had occurred in the penal field.”203 
To summarize the unique European penal philosophy on which its rules are based, 
the European Standard Minimum Rules set forth the following ideals: (a) that conditions 
of confinement should not be punitive because deprivation of liberty was punishment 
enough; (b) that treatment must be the principle aim of punishment; and (c) and that the 
 
199 Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 205. 
200 See id.
201 Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 205. 
202 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States (Strasbourg, Feb. 12, 1987). 
203 Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 206. 
“administration of prisons must show respect for the fundamental rights of individuals, 
and at all times uphold the values that nourish human dignity.”204 To emphasize the 
regional quality of the rules, the Council of Europe elected to rename the 1987 revision 
the “European Prison Rules.”205 
The content of the European Prison Rules remains very similar to the Standard 
Minimum Rules.206 A significant effort was made in the revision process, however, to 
take into account the experience in the implementation of the existing rules, the views 
and proposals of member states, and the results of studies into specific aspects of penal 
treatment and administration by the Council of Europe, as well as relevant ideas from 
academia and professional experts, political, and public opinion.207 The most significant 
aspect of the revised European Prison Rules is its enhanced preamble and explanatory 
memorandum, which emphasizes the above-referenced European penal philosophy in 
order to provide a greater “moral imperative,” to give the rules a “stronger philosophical 
base,” and a “more credible operational validity.”208 To increase effectiveness, the 
European Prison Rules set forth a more explicit regime of “regular inspections” and 
monitoring by a “competent  authority” to ensure compliance with the objectives and 
requirements of the rules.209 Compliance is also aided by the increased availability of 
 
204 Id. at 206-07. 
205 Id. at 210. 
206 See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.57. 
207 Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 208. 
208 Id. at 208-10. 
209 European Prison Rules, Rule 4 of the Basic Principles. 
judicial review by a regional court set up to review potential human rights violations 
under the European Convention.  
 2. European Convention 
The European Convention was implemented in 1950 to secure the universal 
recognition and observance of the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, including the right most relevant to prisoners to be free from torture and other 
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.210 The European Convention 
created a right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights, 
which was established in 1954, and the European Court of Human Rights, which was 
established in 1959.211 Since 1999, a new version of the European Court of Human 
Rights has jurisdiction over both admissibility and the merits of complaints alleging 
violations of the Convention.212 The exclusive responsibility of the European Court of 
Human Rights is to supervise the application of the European Convention through 
hearing complaints by individuals or contracting states.213 Located in Strasbourg, 
individuals have the option of seeking redress for violations of the European Convention 
 
210 See European Convention, Article 3. 
211 LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 5. 
212 LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.09.  
Previously, applications were first submitted to the European Commission on 
Human Rights and, if admissible and if not subject to resolution by way of 
“friendly settlement,” then later by the European Court of Human Rights.  Id. at 
3.10. 
213 See Kieran St. Clair Bradley, The European Court of Justice, in INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION at 119 (John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, eds., 2002).  
It is not to be confused with the European Court of Justice, which sits in 
Luxembourg as the ultimate authority for the interpretation of legal acts affecting 
the rules and practices of the European Community.  See id.
by filing a simple letter complaint or application with the European Court of Human 
Rights, provided that they have first exhausted domestic remedies.214 
Over time, the European Convention and the European Court of Human Rights 
have had increased importance in protecting the rights of prisoners at the regional level.  
Applications from persons in detention make up the majority of cases considered by the 
European Court of Human Rights, which has defined a wide range of rights in the prison 
context.215 The provision of the European Convention most applicable to the prisoner is 
found in Article 3, which simply mandates as follows: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Article 3 provides no 
definition for the type of treatment or punishment that is deemed torture as opposed to 
that which constitutes inhuman or degrading, but cases interpreting Article 3 have 
attempted to distinguish these concepts. 
 An overview of prisoner cases decided under the European Convention exceeds 
the scope of this paper.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting several decisions from the 
European Court of Human Rights and its predecessor, the European Commission on 
Human Rights, that have clarified what type of conditions constitute “inhuman or 
degrading treatment” in violation of Article 3.  Overcrowded, unsanitary, inadequately 
 
214 LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 3.09, 
3.12, 3.25.  The responsibility for ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention are protected lies first with the member states.  See id. at § 
3.09.  
215 See id. at § 3.03.  For example, decisions that have had a “significant impact” in 
the United Kingdom include areas of disciplinary procedures, access to the courts 
and the outside world, release procedures for “life sentence prisoner and prisoners 
detained during Her Majesty’s Pleasure,” the treatment of detainees, prisoners’ 
rights to marry, and secrecy regarding prisons.  Id.
ventilated, and pest-infested conditions have been found to violate Article 3.216 Lack of 
adequate accommodations for a severely handicapped detainee has been found to violate 
Article 3.217 Lack of access to prompt medical treatment or adequate psychiatric care 
may also pose a violation of Article 3.218 Whether conditions rise to the level of torture 
is a separate matter.219 
An early case decided by the European Commission of Human Rights (the Greek 
Case) made a distinction between torture and treatment that is considered inhuman or 
 
216 The Greek Case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights No. 12,
1969; Dougoz v. Greece, Judgment of 6 March 2001; Peers v. Greece, Judgment 
of 19 April 21. Kalashnikov v. Russia, Judgment of 15 July 2002. 
217 Price v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 July 2001. 
218 See, e.g., Hurtado v. Switzerland, Judgment of 26 January 1994 (finding that 
states have a positive duty to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived 
of their liberty, which duty requires adequate medical treatment); Ilhan v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 27 June 2000 (finding that a 36-hour delay in providing medical care 
to a visibly injured detainee was so cruel as to possibly amount to torture); 
Keenan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 3 April 2001 (finding that a mentally ill 
prisoner who committed suicide was provided with inadequate psychiatric care); 
compare with Tas v. Turkey, Judgment of 14 November 2000 (finding that 
medical care was promptly provided for a detainee); Rehbock v. Slovenia, 
Judgment of 28 November 2000 (finding that failure to provide pain-killing 
medication on occasions where the prisoner had suffered a double fracture of his 
jaw did not violate Article 3). 
219 Torture is more frequently associated with custodial interrogation by police.  
Conditions of custodial confinement, by contrast, are typically examined under 
the norm that prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  It is recognized, 
nevertheless, that conditions of punishment can be so severe as to constitute 
torture.  See, e.g., Rod Morgan, The European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, reprinted in 
IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW at 727 (discussing torture as reserved for 
“specialized, or exotic, forms of violence purposefully employed . . . to gain a 
confession or information or to intimidate or humiliate, and involving severe 
pain” as opposed to ill-treatment while in “non-police” settings). 
degrading based on the nature and severity of the treatment.220 In that case, the 
Commission found that “inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately 
causes suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation is unjustifiable.”221 
Torture, by contrast, was considered an “aggravated form of inhuman treatment.”222 
Since the Greek Case, the European Court of Human Rights made a similar analytical 
distinction between torture and ill-treatment in a case that addressed the use of five 
specific interrogation techniques designed to cause disorientation and sensory 
deprivation.223 The European Court decided that these techniques were not torture 
because the suffering inflicted was not sufficiently severe, but that the techniques were 
nonetheless degrading and cruel in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.224 
220 The Greek Case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights No. 12,
1969.   See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 
341-407 (dedicating an entire chapter – Problem V – to the situation in Greece 
and the different responses by the international community, including the United 
Nations Human Rights committee and the European Commission of Human 
Rights, culminating in the Greek Case).   
221 Anthony Cullen, Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of the 
Concept Employed by the European Court of Human Rights, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L. 
J. 29, 35 (2003) (quoting The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 186 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R.)).  
222 Id. The Greek Case further defines degrading treatment as that which “grossly 
humiliates” a person “before others or drives him to act against his will or 
conscience.”  Forti II rejects this definition as “too abstract” to define a violation 
of customary international law.  694 F. Supp. at 712. 
223 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1980) (involving members of a 
terrorist group – the Irish Republican Army – who were detained in police 
custody).  The case concerned the following techniques employed by British 
Security Forces for the purpose of extracting information: (a) wall standing for 
extended periods in a “stress position”; (2) hooding of detainees heads while not 
in interrogation; (3) subjection to continuous loud noise; (4) deprivation of sleep; 
and (5) deprivation of food and drink.  Id. at ¶ 96.   
224 Id. at ¶ 174. 
Thus, whether treatment constitutes “torture” or “inhuman and degrading treatment” in 
violation of Article 3 is a matter of degree in severity, depending entirely on the 
circumstances.225 
Applying this standard to a case involving prison conditions, the European Court 
of Human Rights appears to have clarified that conditions of confinement, standing alone, 
concern primarily the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.226 The Court explained that “ill-treatment, including punishment, must 
attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3.”227 The 
Court elaborated that treatment is inhuman in violation of Article 3 “if it is applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and 
mental suffering[.]”228 Treatment is considered “degrading” in violation of Article 3 if it 
is “such as to arouse in [its] victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral 
 
225 Id. at ¶ 162; see also LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 9, at 765 (discussing the Irish case and the distinction between “torture” as 
opposed to “inhuman and degrading treatment”). 
226 In re Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). The Soering case, however, is not 
without political overtones.  The Soering case involved a proceeding in which the 
United States sought extradition of a German national who was in custody of the 
United Kingdom to face charges in the State of Virginia for a gruesome capital 
murder that he confessed to committing.  Id. at ¶¶ 11-26.  Because the offense 
carried a possible death sentence, the court in Soering examined conditions at the 
Mecklenburg Correctional Center in Virginia and considered whether the risk of 
exposing a prisoner to “death row phenomenon” would violate the prohibition 
found in Article 3 of the European Convention against extraditing someone where 
the subject might be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment.  Id. at ¶ 93. 
227 Id. at ¶ 100.   
228 Id. 
resistance.”229 The Court declined to find, however, that these conditions constituted 
torture.230 
Prisoners have a wide variety of rights under the European Convention.  What this 
review shows, however, is that a judicial inquiry in a prisoner case before the European 
high court for human rights is more likely to focus on whether the complained of 
condition constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment unless the its consequences are so 
severe as to qualify as torture.  European courts are aided in this enquiry by the existence 
of the European Torture Convention and a committee that undertakes to prevent torture 
by regularly inspecting places of detention in Europe. 
 3. The European Torture Convention 
Europe plainly recognizes that torture is one of the most serious human rights 
violations, that it is considered a peremptory norm, and that this norm cannot be 
 
229 Id. 
230 The Soering Court noted that prisoners on death row experience delay before their 
executions while they exhaust their appellate and collateral remedies and opined 
that the delay is accompanied by “increasing tension and psychological trauma.” 
Id. at ¶ 105.  In addition, the petitioner in Soering expressed fear that he might 
face homosexual abuse and physical attack from other prisoners on death row.  Id. 
at ¶ 107.  Adopting the so-called “death row phenomenon,” the Soering court 
ultimately concluded that the “very long period of time spent on death row in such 
extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting 
execution of the death penalty,” in light of the personal circumstances of the 
youthful and purportedly vulnerable offender, “exposed him to a real risk of 
treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3.”  Id. at ¶ 111.  Today there 
is a split of authority about whether lengthy detention on death row, without the 
existence of compelling circumstances, violates important civil rights.  See 
Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Comm. No. 555/1993, CCPR/C/61/D/555/1993 
(15 January 1998) (discussing detailed views set forth in Errol Johnson v. 
Jamaica, Comm. No. 588/1994 (22 March 1996)); see also LILLICH & HANNUM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 760 (citing cases on both sides). 
derogated from even in time of war or emergency.231 The European Torture Convention, 
which came into force in 1989, recites the prohibition found in Article 3 of the European 
Convention, emphasizing that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 232 Unlike the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, however, the European Torture Convention has no definition of what constitutes 
torture or what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which is 
sometimes referred to generally as “ill treatment.”233 The definition of what type of 
treatment constitutes torture or ill treatment has been formed in practice by the committee 
designed to monitor compliance.234 
231 Torture is prohibited by Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well 
as by the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 867, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (The prohibition against torture is so universally 
recognized that “the torturer has become — like the pirate and slave trader before 
him — hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); LIVINGSTONE, OWEN,
& MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.41. 
232 Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 126 (26 Nov. 1987).  To date, the European 
Torture Convention has been ratified by forty-five of the European Council’s 
forty-six member states.  See LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 192, at 3.  Monaco signed the Convention on October 5, 2004, but had 
not ratified it by 2005.  See id. at 7, n.29.  Protocol No. 1 of the European Torture  
Convention, which came into force on March 1, 2002, allows the Committee of 
Ministers for the Council of Europe to invite non-member states to accede to the 
Convention.  See id. at 3.   
233 See MALCOLM D. EVANS AND ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 98 (1998). 
234 See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.41 
(noting that jurisprudence on Article 3 of the European Convention has played a 
part in forming a working definition, but that the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture views its mandate as more extensive, extending to “general 
conditions of imprisonment in so far as they may give rise to at least a risk of 
degrading treatment”). 
Compliance with the European Torture Convention is monitored by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture or Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (the “CPT”).235 To encourage compliance, the CPT conducts periodic and ad
hoc follow-up inspection visits to places of detention, including prisons, police stations, 
and psychiatric hospitals.236 From these visits the CPT has developed a body of 
jurisprudence consisting of its reports.237 The reports are confidential unless the state 
requests that it be published, which a large majority have been.238 The reports typically 
include a request for the state to report back to the CPT within a year on the steps it has 
taken to comply with any recommendations made.239 If a state fails to comply, or 
otherwise proves un-cooperative, the CPT may issue a public statement.240 Public 
statements have been issued, for example, with respect to conditions of detention in 
 
235 LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 3.  
236 See id. at 3.  Interestingly, under Article 17(3), the CPT does not  visit places that 
“representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (the “ICRC”) 
‘effectively visit on a regular basis by virtue of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 18 June 1977 thereto’.”  
LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24 at § 3.43. 
237 LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 3.  These reports 
are confidential, but may be published with the agreement of the contracting state.  
See id.
238 LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.44 
(noting that, as of the CPT’s Twelfth Annual Report,  89 of 129 submitted reports 
have been made public). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
Turkey, and the failure of Russian authorities to co-operate with some aspects of an 
inquiry into conditions of detention in the Chechen Republic.241 
Since its inception, lack of definition has posed both a problem and an 
opportunity for the CPT and its ability to carve out distinctions between torture and lesser 
forms of ill treatment.242 Absent immutable  propositions that restrict its range of 
activities, CPT remains free to test the limits of the prohibition found in Article 3 “by 
exploring – and revealing – the range of circumstances which potentially might be 
considered as within its ambit.”243 This means that CPT has a virtually unfettered 
mandate to investigate.  To assist in its mission, the CPT has developed its own set of 
prison standards.244 The CPT Standards, which consist of extracts from substantive 
sections of the CPT’s general reports, are disjointed and contain no precise definition of 
torture or ill treatment.245 The CPT Standards do attempt, however, to identify 
conditions and practices that represent cause for concern, such as overcrowding.246 
241 Id. 
242 See EVANS AND MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE, supra note 233, at 73 
(observing that, because there is no clear understanding in the drafting history of 
what was meant in Article 3 by “torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,” the preventative mechanism established by the CPT “is built on 
sand”). 
243 Id. 
244 See Council of Europe, The CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002), Rev. 2003, 
available at: www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.doc.
245 For example, without attempting to define ill-treatment, the CPT Standards 
simply recognize that “[i]ll-treatment can take numerous forms, many of which 
may not be deliberate but rather the result of ]organizational] failings or 
inadequate resources.” Id. at 17. 
246 See id.
Thus, the CPT Standards supply a much needed level of detail about what kinds of 
conditions and treatment are preferable and what kinds are unacceptable.247 
4. Continued Progress of the European Prison Rules 
The Council of Europe continues to revise its European Prison Rules to keep up 
with changes in its ever-growing region, evolution of penal practices, and information 
obtained in the implementation process.  On January 11, 2006, the Council of Europe 
reportedly adopted a new recommendation to update the European Prison Rules to take 
into account recent case law by the European Court of Human Rights  as well as 
standards developed by the CPT.248 The newly revised version of the European Prison 
Rules, which reportedly features a separate section on inspection and monitoring by 
government and independent bodies at a national and local level,249 has the potential to be 
an even more powerful instrument for prison reform that the 1987 version, in part, 
because of the CPT and its inspection activities.250 
The Council of Europe has also proposed a European Prison Charter, which is 
reportedly less comprehensive than the European Prison Rules, but binding like a 
 
247 For example, the CPT Standards broadly state that “[r]eady access to proper toilet 
facilities and the maintenance of good standards of hygiene are essential 
components of a humane environment.”  Id. at 18.  The CPT specifically 
expresses its dislike for the practice of “slopping out,” which is employed in many 
European countries that do not provide prisoners with access to toilets, forcing 
those prisoners to use a bucket in their cells to discharge human waste.  See id.
248 Professor Dirk van Zyl Smit has acted as an expert to assist the Council of Europe 
in revising the rules, the first draft of which was proposed in 2004.   
249 Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Human Rights and Best Practice as Factors in 
Prison Reform at 11 (Paper presented at the 14th World Congress on Criminology, 
Philadelphia, U.S.A., August 2005), available at: 
www.worldcriminology2005.org/vanZylSmit.doc.
250 See id. at 4. 
treaty.251 The need for a binding prison charter highlights a lingering problem with all 
systems based on soft model guidelines or standards: lack of enforceability.  Unless the 
European Prison Rules are adopted and implemented in domestic law they are not 
enforceable.  If the process of adopting a convention on prisoners’ rights is as fraught 
with problems as the proposed European Constitution, which remains unratified by all of 
the member states, it remains to be seen whether consensus on a regional prison charter 
can be obtained. 
 B. Prison Standards and Prisoners’ Rights in the United States  
Turning to the United States, which for the most part has not adopted the Standard 
Minimum Rules wholesale, a review of the regime of standards and rights applicable to 
prisoners appears similar in many respect to the system in place in Europe.  The United 
States has a long history of prison standards, many of which pre-date the Standard 
Minimum Rules.  Prisoners in the United States also have a variety of protections found 
in the Bill of Rights attached to the United States Constitution, which had even greater 
effect following the passage of important civil rights legislation in 1964.  Similar to 
detention facilities in Europe, prisons and jails in the United States may be subjected to 
intermittent inspections for the purpose of accreditation, which monitors compliance with 
standards and constitutional guidelines.  These features are discussed below before 
commenting on the status of the Standard Minimum Rules in the United States. 
 1. Early Standards 
In contrast to Europe, the Standard Minimum Rules have not been formally 
adopted in most United States jurisdictions.  This does not mean, however, that United 
 
251 See id. at 7, 11. 
States prison systems are lacking in standards to govern conditions of confinement.  
Many of the prison standards that are still in use in the United States today pre-date the 
ones found in the Standard Minimum Rules adopted in 1955, and those which were 
adopted in Europe in 1973.  The 1870 Declaration of Principles published at the first 
National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati are credited 
as “the basis for the development of standards in corrections.”252 As noted above, the 
ACA published its Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System in 
1946.253 Subsequently, the ACA issued revised versions of its Manual of Correctional 
Standards in 1954, 1959, and 1966, as well as many other publications related to 
correctional administration, rehabilitative treatment, and professional issues.254 
The Standard Minimum Rules have not been without influence on the ACA 
standards.  In the last revised version of its Manual, the ACA expressly adopted a 
“statement of ‘minimum standards to govern correctional officials in dealing with the 
rights of prisoners’” that was “drawn in the main from the Standard Minimum Rules.255 
Thus, the ACA Manual of Correctional Standards has been hailed as containing 
guidelines that are “identical or parallel” to the Standard Minimum Rules.256 
252 TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 97.  
253 Id. at 98.   
254 Id. at 84-85, 88, 97-99.  For example, the ACA published a Handbook on 
Classification in Correctional Institutions in 1947, which was later updated.   
255 AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL 
STANDARDS 266-67(3rd ed. 1966).  
256 See Besharov & Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 852 (observing that 
“[t]he Manual of Correctional Standards, issued by the American Correction 
Association which represents American professional opinion on the subject has 
The ACA standards reportedly worked well until the mid 1960s, when something 
changed that would alter the course of corrections in the United States.257 That event was 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1983 of which established a 
remedy for constitutional violations by state actors such as correctional officials.258 Thus 
began the end of the so-called “hands-off” era of prisoners’ rights in the United States as 
prison administrators became obliged to go beyond standards to follow practices and 
policies that complied with constitutional requirements.  
 2. Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation 
As with the rights outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
United States Constitution has many provisions in its Bill of Rights that are of great 
benefit to persons deprived of their liberty.  Notably, the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution succinctly prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment.259 
According precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the original intent of the 
drafters “was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”260 
identical or parallel standards to . . . the [Standard Minimum Rules”) (citing the 
AMERICAN CORRECTION ASS’N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (3d ed. 
1966)). 
257 TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 99 (commenting on the evolution of 
standards through the 1960s and the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
258 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
259 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
260 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Granucci, Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 
(1969)).  Initially, the Eighth Amendment was used to challenge methods of 
execution and “concededly inhuman techniques of punishment.”  Estelle, 429
U.S. at 102 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to 
affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that is excessive under the theory that a 
disproportionate penalty is cruel and unusual.261 The prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment also has been extended to cover prison conditions and the treatment accorded 
to prisoners after sentence has been imposed. 262 
Nevertheless, prisoners in the United States did not always have standing to 
challenge cruel conditions of confinement in a court of law.  Prisoners in the United 
States were once considered “slaves of the state” with few rights, if any.263 For a long 
time the courts accorded virtually unfettered deference to prison administrators over day-
to-day management decisions. This “[hands-off] attitude toward problems of prison 
administration” was justified, in part, because of the recognition that increased 
interference by the courts would result an unwieldy system of judicial micro-
management: 
 
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth Amendment] . . .”); In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve 
torture or a lingering death . . . .”)). 
261 For example, the Supreme Court has recently excluded the use of capital 
punishment for offenders who committed heinous capital crimes before the age of 
eighteen.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  Likewise, offenders 
whose sub-average intelligence meets the criteria for mental retardation are 
exempt from the death penalty under the theory that executing persons who lack 
the mental capacity to appreciate the heinous nature of their actions as cruel.  See 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
262 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 290-91 (“The infliction of . . . unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern 
legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘[i]t is but just that the public be 
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his 
liberty, care for himself.’”) (footnote and citations omitted). 
263 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871); see also United 
States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 711-713 (7th Cir. 1973) (rejecting 
the view once held by some state courts that a prison inmate is a mere slave). 
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative 
and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are 
ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison 
administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no 
more than a healthy sense of realism.264 
During the 1960s, however, prisoner litigation increased with the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and the recognition that Section 1983 of that Act, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, could afford a remedy in federal court for constitutional violations 
committed by officials acting under “color of law.”265 
As increased attention to civil rights extended to the prison environment, the 
United States Supreme Court signaled an end to the hands-off era, confirming that “[a] 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for 
crime.  There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
 
264 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405 (1974) (footnote omitted).   
265 Section 1983 of United States Code Title 42 provides that “Every person who, 
under colour of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress.”  Section 1983 applies to state officers who 
act under colour of state law.  See Monell v. Department of Social Srvs., 436 U.S. 
651 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  Civil rights suits against 
federal officials for constitutional violations are available under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
country.”266 The demise of the hands-off era and the rise of prisoners’ rights triggered a 
revolution that would transform prison systems within the United States.267 Several state 
prison systems were declared unconstitutional and placed under court-supervised 
monitoring.268 Indeed, by 1993 nearly forty states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands were under some form of court supervision or consent 
decree as the result of prisoner civil rights lawsuits.269 Twelve jurisdictions were under 
court orders covering their entire systems.270 
With increased funds from state legislatures that were required to bring state penal 
systems in line with constitutional requirements, the civil rights revolution 
unquestionably has improved prison conditions throughout the United States.271 These 
 
266 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). 
267 See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S
PRISONS (1998); BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE 
FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS (1991); COURTS,
CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John J. DiIulio, Jr., ed., 1990); STEVE J. MARTIN &
SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN 
(1987). 
268 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (Arkansas); Gates 
v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (Mississippi); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. 
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Alabama); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980) (Texas).   
269 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 2.15 at 328 (3rd ed. 2002) (citing 
Edward I. Koren, Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts - January 1993, 8 J. 
Nat’l Prison Project 3 (1993)). 
270 Id. Those jurisdictions included Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
the District of Columbia. See id. 
271 By 1995, the number of states subject to a court order or consent decree dropped 
to 33 and only nine states remained under court supervision that extended to their 
improvements are monitored extensively by a variety of professional and governmental 
organizations, which have been charged with updating standards and inspecting prison 
and jail facilities for compliance.  Non-governmental prisoners’ rights organizations also 
continue to monitor compliance with court-imposed mandates with the goal of initiating 
litigation to obtain redress for conditions that fall below constitutionally acceptable 
standards.272 
3. Continued Development of Standards and the Accreditation 
Process 
Since the prisoner civil rights revolution, there has been a plethora of standards 
published for use in United States prison and detention facilities.  The American 
Correctional Association has continued to publish standards for a variety of different 
settings, including correctional institutions, jails, and adult local detention facilities.273 
The United States Bureau of Prisons issued a set of standards that generally approximate 
 
entire prison system. See id. The advent of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the 
“PLRA”) in 1996, has made it easier for states to terminate consent decrees 
involving prison conditions.   
272 A good example of a private prisoners’ rights advocacy group is the American 
Civil Liberties Union and its National Prison Project, which operates a national 
litigation program on behalf of prisoners in the United States.  See 
www.aclu.org/prison. Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) and Human 
Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) are two other non-governmental organizations that 
concern themselves with prison conditions and the rights of the incarcerated.   
273 See, e.g., ACA, Standards Supplement (2006); ACA, Standards for Adult 
Correctional Institutions (3rd ed. 1990); ACA, Standards for Adult Local 
Detention Facilities (1991); ACA, Standards for Adult Correctional Boot Camp 
Programs (1995); ACA, Standards for Small Jail Facilities (1989).  Additional 
publications by the ACA can be found at their website, www.aca.org. 
the Standard Minimum Rules.274 Model rules for jail administration have also been 
issued by the National Sheriffs’ Association.275 The United States Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau has a set of 
guidelines and standards for its immigration detention centers.276 Private prison facilities 
in the United States, such as those run by the Corrections Corporation of America, are 
also subject to stringent standards.277 State, local, and municipal authorities also 
frequently compose their own standards for jail facilities.278 
Prison standards also have been developed by professionals other than those 
charged with penal administration.  The American Bar Association (the “ABA”) has 
issued a detailed set of standards concerning the legal status of prisoners and the 
conditions of their confinement, which includes commentary, cites to related standards 
developed by the American Correctional Association, and case citations.279 The useful 
 
274 UNITED STATES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS 
(1980). 
275 See National Sheriffs’ Administration, Jail Administration (1974), Jail Programs 
(1974), Jail Security, Classification, and Discipline (1974). 
276 See United States, Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Detention Operations Manual, available at 
www.ice.gov/partners/dro/opsmanual/index.htm.
277 See Myths v. Reality in Private Corrections: The Truth Behind the Criticism 
www.correctionscorp.com/myths.html (stating that “CCA training of correctional 
staff meets or exceeds all established standards by the American Correctional 
Association, as well as the stringent requirements of the jurisdiction with whom 
the company contracts”).   
278 See, e.g., 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE Part IX, Chapters 251-301 (Texas Commission 
on Jail Standards). 
279 See American Bar Association, Legal Status of Prisoners in IV STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2nd ed.).  The ABA embarked on a project to develop 
standards covering the legal status of prisoners in 1972.  See id. at 4.  After a 
and informative standards established after years of study by the ABA are frequently 
referenced by the courts in connection with cases filed by prisoners.280 
In addition to issuing its correctional standards, the American Correctional 
Association also sponsors an inspection and accreditation program.  Through its 
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, the ACA offers a private, voluntary 
certification program to which corrections facilities may apply for ACA accreditation.281 
Accreditation is based on demonstrated compliance with standards adopted by the 
ACA.282 Facilities are accredited for a period of three years following an audit or 
inspection of the facility by representatives of the ACA, which will assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of a correctional facility in a wide variety of categories, and requires 
accredited facilities to make an annual certification thereafter to confirm continued 
compliance.283 Like the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the ACA is 
 
series of tentative drafts, they were approved by the ABA House of Delegates on 
February 9, 1981.  See id. at 5; see also American Bar Association, Standards 
Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (1977) 
(setting out the contents of Tentative Draft No. 4).   
280 See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 363 n.5 (1987); Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 34 n.16 
(1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 142 
& n.4 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830 n.19 (1977); Norris v. District 
of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1158 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Wright v. Rushen, 642 
F.2d 1129, 1135 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 553 
n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Davis, 763 F. Supp. 638, 641 (D.D.C. 
1991); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 750 n.17 (W.D. La. 1982); United 
States v. Hinkley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1358 n.36 (D.D.C. 1981). 
281 See American Correctional Association, http://www.aca.org (including 
information about “Standards and Accreditation”).  
282 See id.
283 See id.
not a judicial body with power to sanction institutions who fail to comport with its 
standards.  The ACA has no authority to require a correctional facility to adopt any 
procedure or to change any existing procedure.284 The ACA’s sole authority is to deny 
accreditation, or to withdraw accreditation from any facility found not to be in 
compliance with ACA standards.285 
Although the ACA lacks enforcement capabilities, obtaining ACA accreditation is 
viewed as a significant accomplishment.286 ACA accreditation has been hailed by courts 
as useful to show a “good faith” effort by prison officials to improve prison conditions.287 
Failure to achieve ACA accreditation is also a relevant consideration during litigation.288 
Maintaining ACA accreditation has been a condition of court ordered injunctive relief for 
deficient prison conditions.289 Compliance with ACA standards is not, however, per se 
284 See id.
285 See id.
286 See Robin Fitzgerald, From Early Scandals to the Distinction of Accreditation, 
Time Tells the Tale of the County Jail, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), April 13, 
2006, at A1 (detailing the tumultuous history of the Biloxi County Jail system 
from 1982, when 29 inmates died in a fire, to its recent accreditation by the ACA 
following numerous improvements). 
287 See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).    
288 See Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1187 (W.D. Tenn. 
2005) (noting that the jail has never received accreditation by the ACA although it 
was moving in that direction); Brian B. v. Stadler, Civ. A. 98-886-D, 2005 WL 
1847000, *4 (M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2005) (unpublished) (noting the failure of a 
privately run prison to gain accreditation by the ACA). 
289 See, e.g., Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 
1998) (setting out the Order Approving Settlement in Williams v. McKeithen, 
Civil Action No. 71-98-B). 
evidence that conditions meet constitutional requirements.290 As the Supreme Court has 
stated regarding the ACA and other jail standards, “while the recommendations of these 
various groups may be instructive . . . , they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima; rather they establish goals recommended by the organization in question.”291 
4. Status of the Standard Minimum Rules in the United States 
Even without wholesale implementation, the Standard Minimum Rules clearly 
have not played an unimportant part of the increased application of rights to prisoners and 
the improvement of prison conditions.  For example, a hallmark of the modern prison 
reform movement can be traced to the 1971 rebellion at the Attica State Prison in New 
York.292 Having seized hostages, the prisoners made a set of demands for amnesty and 
safe transportation from confinement.293 A committee of outside observers met with the 
inmates in an effort to negotiate a peaceful end to the uprising.294 Prison officials agreed 
to a set of proposals for improved prison conditions.295 When the inmates rejected the 
 
290 See Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 924-25 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (commending participation 
by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in the ACA accreditation process, 
but recognizing its limitations as a “tool” that does not necessarily equal 
constitutional standards). 
291 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n. 27 (1979). 
292 Alvin J. Bronstein and Jenni Gainsborough, Using International Human Rights 
Laws and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811, 812 (2004) 
(“The prisoner rebellion and its aftermath at Attica in 1971 . . . served as an 
opening into the dark world of America’s prisons and became the catalyst for the 
development of the modern prisoners’ rights movement.”). 
293 NEW YORK STATE COMM’N ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 204-05 (1972). 
294 Id. at 205, 235-38. 
295 Id. at 251-57. 
proposed settlement of penal reform measures, an assault ensued to retake the prison.296 
Thirty-two inmates and eleven prison employees who had been taken hostage were killed 
in the siege.297 As commentators have observed, the reforms proposed during the Attica 
uprising mirrored many of the guidelines offered by the Standard Minimum Rules.298 
Yet, the Standard Minimum Rules have not been fully implemented in the United 
States, which is to say that the United States has not formally adopted them as part of its 
domestic law.  After the Attica rebellion, a few individual states within the United States 
expressly adopted the Standard Minimum Rules.299 Most states, however, have not done 
so.  In 1971, there was a bill introduced in the United States Congress to enact the 
principles of the Standard Minimum Rules into domestic legislation.300 It was not 
successful.  To date, the federal government has not formally adopted the Standard 
Minimum Rules, although federal standards supposedly approximate the Rules.301 
296 Id. at 333. 
297 Id. at Appendix D & E. 
298 See Besharov & Mueller, The Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners: A 
Comparison, supra note 13, at 839. 
299 ABA, Corrections Comm’n, The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 637 (1975) (identifying Pennsylvania 
(1971), Connecticut (1974), South Carolina (1974), and Illinois (1974) as states 
that have adopted the Standard Minimum Rules directly or by reference, as well 
as Ohio (1974) and Minnesota (1974) as among the states adopting the Standard 
Minimum Rules in some fashion). 
300 See Besharov & Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 854 (citing H.R. 
11605, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Congressman Charles Rangel)). 
301 See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 315 
(citing United States Dep’t of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 
(1980)). 
Likewise, principles of the Standard Minimum Rules are reportedly comparable to those 
incorporated into the 1962 Model Penal Code and the correctional standards developed in 
1973 by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 
suggesting an influence.302 
Apart from their influence on existing prison standards, the Standard Minimum 
Rules have been invoked by courts looking for guidance within the United States.  Actual 
discussion of the Standard Minimum Rules, however, is scarce.  For the most part 
domestic courts have pointed to the Standard Minimum Rules as evidence of customary 
international law.303 In that respect, courts in the United States have limited the role of 
the Standard Minimum Rules to informational or advisory of what constitutes accepted 
state practice.  The United States Supreme Court has characterized the Standard 
Minimum Rules as evidence of “contemporary standards of decency” of the sort that 
informs an Eighth Amendment analysis.304 The Court has stopped short, however, of 
equating guidelines found in the Standard Minimum Rules with constitutional 
requirements.  In another case, the Supreme Court has viewed the Standard Minimum 
Rules in a more limited manner as instructive recommendations, but not as establishing a 
 
302 See Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules, supra note 140, at 453, 461 & n.22. 
303 Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1189 (D. Conn. 1980) (observing that the 
Standard Minimum Rules “may be significant as expressions of the obligations to 
the international community of the member states of the United Nations.”); 
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 132 n. 21 (citing the Standard Minimum Rules as 
among those “contemporary expressions” of the concern with minimizing 
“dehumanizing treatment of prisoners”). 
304 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 103-04 & n.8 (1976). 
constitutional minimum.305 Standards such as those issued by the American Correctional 
Association are viewed similarly as guidelines for what is considered appropriate prison 
administration,306 but not equal to what is constitutionally required.307 
Although courts in the United States appear to have given the Standard Minimum 
Rules short shrift, this does not necessarily mean that the United States fails to comport 
with the guidelines provided therein.  It is possible to discern through a brief review of 
the standards published by the ACA and the ABA, as well as major court decisions 
enlarging the constitutional rights of prisoners, that the major substantive provisions 
found in the Standard Minimum Rules have achieved implementation in the United 
States, even if at a piecemeal pace.  As this review attempts to show, the principles 
advanced by the Standard Minimum Rules are recognized and adequately protected in the 
United States by comprehensive professional standards and court rulings on prison 
conditions without the need for actual implementation as that term is understood by the 
United Nations.  
 C. Observations 
305 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) (upholding the practice of double-
bunking). 
306 See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 375 n.3 (1992) 
(examining architectural standards for cell size); Kentucky Department of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 469 & n.5 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissent) 
(pointing to standards issued by governmental and private organizations on 
inmate visitation); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 112 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (citing standards on inmate correspondence rules); 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 552 & n.24 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
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307 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 543, n.27. 
A comparison of Europe and the United States shows that both employ standards 
in an effort to improve conditions within their prison systems.  There are a couple of 
explanations for the differing levels of esteem that the Standard Minimum Rules appear 
to have enjoyed in these regimes.  One factor is the existence of comprehensive 
correctional standards that pre-date the Standard Minimum Rules, which explains why 
the United States has declined to adopt the spartan guidelines approved by the United 
Nations whereas Europe has embraced them wholesale.  Another factor is the differing 
level of judicial control over prison issues within these jurisdictions, which may explain 
why standards occupy a predominant place of importance in Europe.  These observations 
are discussed briefly below. 
 1. Pre-Existing Comprehensive Standards  
The differing degree of influence that the Standard Minimum Rules have had 
within the legal systems in Europe and the United States is, in part, an issue of timing.  
When the Standard Minimum Rules were formally adopted at the First United Nations 
Crime Congress in 1955, the 1870 Declaration of Principles were already firmly 
established and ensconced within professional organizations operating in the United 
States.  Based on the 1870 Declaration of Principles, the American Correctional 
Association had already published at least two comprehensive manuals of correctional 
standards in 1946 and 1954, before the Standard Minimum Rules were formally adopted.  
During the time that professional organizations such as the ACA were issuing 
correctional standards, Europe was being torn asunder by decades of war.  Adopting the 
Standard Minimum Rules wholesale made sense to Europe, but not necessarily for the 
United States, which already had standards that approximated the Standard Minimum 
Rules in principle and exceeded them in terms of detail even before the civil rights 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.   
 Europe’s decision to adopt the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale, while 
undoubtedly beneficial, has not been without difficulty.  The level of detail found in the 
Standard Minimum Rules, or the lack thereof, has forged a critical difference between the 
prison standards found in Europe and the United States that has proven detrimental.  Like 
the Standard Minimum Rules, the European Prison Rules are vague in character, which 
has made the European Prison Rules less useful.  Comprehensive standards such as those 
formulated by the ACA and the ABA, which take into consideration judicial rulings 
about constitutionally required standards for the treatment of prisoners, are seen as more 
useful in their application by prison officials and as guidelines for courts to follow 
concerning what is generally accepted as good practice. 
 One commentator has noted this contrast between prison standards in the United 
States and Europe and has made a connection between lack of detail and the problem of 
enforceability.  “The specificity of some of these American codes of standards has a 
direct bearing on the question of compliance.”308 Where comprehensive standards exist, 
“[t]here is less room for varying interpretations, a problem besetting the European Prison 
Rules, whose vague wording and qualified statements of principle create loopholes and 
allow circumvention.”309 This commentator has also noted that standards and systems of 
accreditation have a place in developing “good practice” in the correctional context, but 
that standards are “no substitute for a system which obliges compliance” such as the one 
 
308 Silvia Casale, Conditions and Standards, in PRISONS AFTER WOOLF: REFORM 
THROUGH RIOT at 74 (Elaine Player and Michael Jenkins, eds., 1994). 
309 Id.
in place in the United States, for which the system of accreditation operates against a 
background of minimum standards at the federal, state, and local level, and which also 
features active judicial intervention to enforce those standards.310 
The growing body of jurisprudence by the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (the CPT) further illustrates how the vague character of the 
European Prison Rules detracts from their effectiveness.  It has been observed that, 
whereas the European Prison Rules are seen as vague and unhelpful, the impact of the 
specific comments and general reports made annually by the CPT have provided a guide 
to “European ‘good practice’ in relation to prison conditions and regimes and appear to 
have greater influence on the decisions of [the European Court of Human Rights] than the 
European Prison Rules . . . .”311 Thus, judicial enforcement is also aided by the 
availability of comprehensive standards.   
 Another factor that militates against adopting the Standard Minimum Rules at this 
point is that they are out of date.  As one commentator has observed, their dated character 
leaves the Standard Minimum Rules “vulnerable to criticism” and, perhaps more 
importantly, they lack a “compelling underlying  rationale” which further diminishes 
their application and influence.312 Given the small number of nations that responded to 
the periodic surveys issued by the United Nations, revisions to the Standard Minimum 
Rules are not likely.  Therefore, future progress with respect to guidelines regulating 
 
310 Id. 
311 LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.45. 
312 Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 207. 
prison conditions almost certainly will be at the regional level.313 To its credit, Europe 
has at least attempted to remedy this deficiency with updated revisions that are tailored to 
regional needs while advancing a distinct philosophy that is relevant to the area of 
geographic application.  Because the United States finds itself with a plethora of well-
developed standards by professional organizations, as well as federal, state, and local 
authorities, there is little incentive at this point to adopt the antiquated Standard 
Minimum Rules. 
 2. Differing Levels of Judicial Control 
Another reason that the Standard Minimum Rules have thrived in Europe is that 
the role of the judiciary appears less prominent than in the United States, where prison 
reform has been driven by court intervention or, as some would say, judicial activism.  
Although the European Court of Human Rights has issued many important decisions 
concerning prisoners’ issues, there are some significant limitations to review by the 
Strasbourg court.  Less than 25 percent of the applications submitted ultimately have 
been found admissible.314 In that respect, limits on admissibility require a party to 
exhaust all available domestic remedies and to file his or her application with the 
European Court of Human Rights within six months of the domestic tribunal’s final 
decision.315 An application may be deemed inadmissible if it appears “manifestly ill-
founded,” such as if the allegations do not disclose an arguable breach of the 
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Convention.316 There are other limits on admissibility found in Article 35 of the 
European Convention, which has been amended recently in an effort to further restrict the 
European Court’s burgeoning workload.317 
Apart from the European Court of Human Rights it is less clear what role, if any, 
that domestic courts in European member states have had in extending the rule of law to 
prisoner complaints about conditions of confinement.  Europe, as in the United States, 
had adopted a “hands-off” attitude toward prisoner litigation in the past.318 The United 
Kingdom, for example, did not extend court jurisdiction over a complaint against the 
government agency responsible for supervising prisoners until 1979.319 Domestic courts 
in the United Kingdom did not become active in extending rights to prisoners until the 
1980s.320 
316 Id. at § 3.32 (citing Article 35(3) of the European Convention). 
317 LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 9 (citing 
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 194, May 13, 
2004).  The new criteria establishes a three-part test that will result in a 
declaration of inadmissibility if the following are met: (1) the applicant has not 
suffered a significant disadvantage; (2) unless respect for human rights requires 
an examination of the application on the merits; and (3) provided that no case that 
no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a 
domestic tribunal.  See LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
192, at 9 (citing Article 12 of Protocol 14, amending Article 35(3) of the 
European Convention). 
318 See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 
16.01, 16.17 (referencing the demise of the “judicial ‘hands off’ approach” by 
domestic and regional courts in the 1970s). 
319 See id. at § 2.77 (citing Regina v. Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex parte St. 
Germaine, [1979] QB 425). 
320 See id. at § 16.17 (commenting on the “unexpected willingness” of the judiciary 
to involve themselves in the control of prison administration by the late 1980s). 
The legal status of prisoners differs among the European states depending on 
whether a country’s prison system is part of a political system in which oversight is 
conducted by administrative, legislative, or executive departments, as opposed to prison 
systems that also operate under a system of judicial oversight.321 Some countries have no 
judicial control over prison conditions, others have limited amounts of judicial control, 
while still others have significant judicial control.322 
France is one example of a country with significant judicial control over 
prisons.323 Since 1958, each French prison has been assigned a judge who has both 
administrative and judicial functions in the prison setting.324 Because the level of judicial 
control is so strong, the political influence over prisons in France is weak.  There is no 
political control over prisons at the national level, leaving their regulation to local 
authorities.325 Spanish prisoners are also subject to significant amounts of judicial 
control.326 In Spain, prisoners have the right to complain to prison administration, the 
 
321 See PHILIP L. REICHEL, CORRECTIONS: PHILOSOPHIES, PRACTICES, AND 
PROCEDURES 541 (2nd ed. 2000). 
322 See id. at 542. 
323 See REICHEL, CORRECTIONS: PHILOSOPHIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES, supra 
note 321, at 543. 
324 See id.
325 See Philippe Combesse, France, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS 
at 262. 
326 See REICHEL, CORRECTIONS: PHILOSOPHIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES, supra 
note 321, at 543. 
courts, an ombudsman, the prosecutor, or any other public authority.327 Similarly, all 
prison decisions made by German authorities are subject to judicial review.328 
In contrast to the domestic legal systems found in France, Spain, and Germany, 
judicial control is limited in Sweden, which instead emphasizes political control in the 
form of an ombudsman.329 The role of courts is down played in the Swedish system.330 
Individual cases decided by central prison administration can be appealed to an 
administrative court.331 Prisoners also have the option to appeal to an ombudsman.332 
Austria is another example of a jurisdiction that operates primarily under a system of 
political control, in which prisoner complaints are handled by the head of the institution 
and complaints against the head of the institution are addressed by the Federal Ministry 
of Justice.333 
327 Jose Louis de la Cuesta and Isidoro Blanco, Spain, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND 
TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON 
CONDITIONS at 614-15. 
328 Frieder Dünkel and Dieter Rossner, Germany, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND 
TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON 
CONDITIONS at 315-16 (Dirk van Zyl Smit and Frieder Dünkel, eds., 2nd ed. 
2001). 
329 See REICHEL, CORRECTIONS: PHILOSOPHIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES, supra 
note 321, at 541. 
330 Hanns von Hofer and Ryan Marvin, Sweden, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND 
TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON 
CONDITIONS at 638. 
331 See id.
332 See id.
333 Wolfgang Gratz, et. al, Austria, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS 
at 15-16 (Dirk van Zyl Smit and Frieder Dünkel, eds., 2nd ed. 2001). 
As this shows, the presence of a strong judiciary can translate into weak control of 
prisons at the administrative level.  By contrast, countries with strong administrative 
control often feature a very limited judicial role.  The limited availability of judicial 
review for prisoner complaints within some domestic systems in Europe increases the 
importance of the European Court of Human Rights as a forum.  These limitations also 
increase the importance of continued efforts by the Council of Europe to promulgate a 
revised version of the European Prison Rules as well as the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and its inspection regime, which has produced its own set of 
guidelines in the CPT Standards. Comparatively speaking, it can be concluded from a 
review of the European system that wherever local judicial control is less prominent, 
standards are a more important tool for ensuring minimum levels of acceptable treatment 
for prisoners, while affording less in the way of individual rights.  Thus, standards may 
be more important for protecting prisoners rights where administrative control is more 
prevalent than judicial control.  This may explain why in the United States, where courts 
are unlikely to fully cede an interest in monitoring prison compliance with constitutional 
requirements, standards have lesser importance than they do in Europe. 
 CONCLUSION 
What this paper has attempted to show is that Europe and the United States both 
have prison standards in place, and that these standards have been influenced by the 
Standard Minimum Rules in different ways for good reasons.  These differences reveal 
the strengths and the weaknesses of using model rules or guidelines as a source of law.  
The United States has a variety of well-developed, comprehensive prison standards that 
stem from the 1870 Declaration of Principles and an equally long history of reform 
movements that date back to the very first penitentiary built in the late 1700s.  Even with 
this longstanding interest in the evolution of humane standards, however, significant 
reform arguably has required court involvement in many instances.  Thus, while prison 
standards have been important factors in ensuring humane prison conditions, effective 
reform of prison conditions sometimes has required other mechanisms such as a regime 
of regular inspection or accreditation as well as the availability of judicial intervention.  
In this respect, the European system of prison standards, which has been strengthened by 
the European Convention and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, is 
no different from the one in the United States. 
 It is undisputed that the Standard Minimum Rules, in spite of their advisory, non-
binding status, have played a significant role in elevating prison conditions in countries 
which lacked a tradition of reform.  Because of their advisory nature, however, standards 
are inherently different from enforceable rules such as those found in a convention, 
constitution, or legislative enactment.  As a result, violating a standard does not 
automatically warrant a sanction.  The European Court of Human Rights has recognized 
as much, holding that a mere breach of the European Prison Rules will not amount to a 
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture or other forms 
of cruelty.334 In other words, while conditions may fall short of the standards required by 
the European Prison Rules, this does not necessarily constitute inhuman or degrading 
treatment in violation of the European Convention and the demands of Article 3.335 The 
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United States Supreme Court has reached the same result with regard to the Standard 
Minimum Rules, observing that they are not a constitutional floor.336 
Importantly, not all of the provisions in the Standard Minimum Rules are intended 
or required to be on the level of an actionable constitutional right.  Some of the 
provisions are plainly aspirational, whereas other have achieved legally binding status 
such as the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.  These, however, are also regulated by other multinational conventions, such 
as the CAT and the ICCPR, as well as domestic provision such as those found in the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.   
 Even as a “soft” source of law, standards are not necessarily less important than 
conventional or constitutional rules and judicial decrees.  As one commentator has noted 
it would be a mistake to underestimate the utility of the European Prison Rules and “the 
moral and practical influence they exert,” particularly in light of the increased authority 
in the inspection process and the procedural mechanisms created by the Council of 
Europe to enhance the rules’ enforceability.337 The European Prison Rules have been 
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member states every five years to be studied by an appointed “Select Committee.”  
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“CCPA”) was formed in 1981, and further serves the purpose of enforcement by 
collecting and disseminating information and data, such as through publication of 
the Prison Information Bulletins, as well as identifying “specific problems” that 
may arise in a particular country.  Id. at 213.  Co-operative arrangements to 
achieve remedies for these problems have further enhanced the status of the 
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widely accepted and, although not binding in international law, they are held in high 
regard in the international community because of the political obligations and moral 
sanction imposed on the national authorities who have agreed to be bound by them.338 
European countries that have declined to incorporate the European Prison Rules into their 
domestic law, most notably the United Kingdom,339 have faced significant problems.  In 
that respect, the United Kingdom has been plagued with bad reports about its prisons and 
outbursts of prison violence.340 Its failure to adopt the rules has resulted in criticism.341 
Although many of the standards found in the European Prison Rules exist in the UK 
system, in regulations, manuals, operational codes, and the like, “[w]hat is lacking is a 
discrete codification and the means of enforcement.”342 
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Even with the wide acceptance enjoyed by the European Prison Rules, 
compliance with these standards has been a problem.  In some areas the level of 
compliance is reportedly “barely above the minimum,” although shortfalls are in 
application of some of the rules are allegedly technical or peripheral in nature.343 Thus, 
although Europe has taken great strides in implementing the Standard Minimum Rules, 
clearly there is room for improvement.  That improvement is the addition of other 
mechanisms, such as inspections or accreditation programs, and the obligations placed on 
states and prison administrators by courts with authority to enforce prisoners’ rights. 
 The prospect for a renewed version of the European Prison Rules and for a Prison 
Charter is important because of ongoing political changes in Europe, which continues to 
grow as a union.  The growing number of new member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe is another important factor, as many of these new states (such as Russia) have 
high prison populations.344 Many of these new members have also only recently 
abolished the death penalty, meaning that these states will have to deal with larger 
numbers of prisoners serving life sentences.345 
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Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights have underscored the 
importance that positive obligations have by requiring member states to take action.346 
For example, Russia has been directed to report on steps taken to prevent further human 
rights violations following an adverse judgment, which found violations of Article 3 of 
the European Convention with respect to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of pre-
trial detention.347 As the Court noted, Article 46 of the European Convention obliges 
every state to abide by the judgments of the Court, which includes the adoption of general 
measures to prevent new violations of the Convention similar to those found in the 
Court’s judgments.348 This is an example of the potential part that standards can play in 
improving the prison conditions that exist in former totalitarian states, which in the past 
may have been resistant to international guidelines like the Standard Minimum Rules as 
an unwarranted intrusion into domestic affairs. 
 The world community has an obvious interest in encouraging states without 
adequate prisons or prison standards to adopt the Standard Minimum Rules.  This is why 
the unenthusiastic record of implementation, as demonstrated by the low level of 
responses to United Nations survey efforts, is so troubling.  As one United States district 
court has recently observed, the record of compliance with the reporting requirements on 
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules by United Nations member states 
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constitutes “both relevant practice and evidence of opinio juris” as customary 
international law.349 While the lackluster record of responses to the surveys issued by the 
United Nations is disconcerting, it should not detract from the status of the Standard 
Minimum Rules as evidence of what is considered good practice.350 The proposed draft 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners by the United Nations Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2003 is further evidence of the influence of the 
Standard Minimum Rules and of which norms are recognized as basic. 
 In spite of their aspirational character and the lukewarm response to the United 
Nations’ surveys, “the Rules are meant to be binding on the conscience of nations.”351 
For all of the limitations found in the Geneva Convention regime and its application to 
prisoners taken during an armed conflict,352 the Standard Minimum Rules persist as a 
“global floor” of minimally acceptable treatment for all persons detained no matter what 
the context.353 Therefore, as illustrated by the controversy over the treatment of detainees 
at Guantanamo Bay, prison standards should continue to be an important and not an 
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impotent tool in establishing minimum levels of treatment for the protection of those 
detained under any set of circumstances. 
